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The City of Miami brought lawsuits against Wells Fargo, 
Bank of America, and Citigroup, alleging that the banks 
engaged in discriminatory lending practices in violation of 
the Fair Housing Act. The City claimed that these practices 
led to increased foreclosures, which led to decreased home 
values, resulting in lower property tax revenue for the City. 
The City also claimed that increased foreclosures required 
it to provide increased police, fire, and maintenance services.
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.
In order to receive copyright protection, aesthetic features 
that are incorporated into the design of a useful article, 
such as a garment, lamp, or piece of furniture, must be 
identified separately from, and be capable of existing 
independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article. Courts, 
the Copyright Office, and academics have proposed various 
tests to distinguish between copyrightable materials and 
unprotectable industrial designs. The Sixth Circuit rejected 
all existing tests and created a new test. The Court must now 
determine what the appropriate test is to determine when a 
feature of a useful article is protectable under § 101 of the 
Copyright Act. 
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ISSUES
Does the different treatment of unwed citizen fathers and unwed 
citizen mothers under § 1409(c) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection under the laws? 
Did the Second Circuit err in conferring United States citizenship 
on Morales-Santana, despite no express statutory authority to do so?
FACTS
In 1962, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born to an unwed United 
States citizen father and a Dominican mother. Morales-Santana’s 
father resided in Puerto Rico until February 1919, when he moved 
to the Dominican Republic 20 days before his nineteenth birthday. 
In 1970, Morales-Santana became statutorily “legitimate[ed]” when 
his parents married. Five years later, in 1975, the United States 
admitted Morales-Santana as a lawful permanent resident. The 
following year, his father died. In 2000, he was ordered deported 
after he was convicted of several felonies. Morales-Santana objected, 
claiming that he had derivative citizenship through his father and 
thus was not deportable. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, codifi ed as 
8 U.S.C. § 1409, was the statute in effect at the time of Morales-
Santana’s birth, and thus governed whether he acquired derivative 
citizenship from his father at birth. Under § 1409(c), a child born 
outside of the United States to an unwed citizen father and a 
non-citizen mother only becomes a United States citizen at birth 
if the father (1) was physically present in the United States for a 
total of 10 years or more prior to the child’s birth, and (2) at least 5 
of those years occurred after the father turned fourteen years old. 
In contrast, a child born outside of the United States to an unwed 
citizen mother and a noncitizen father becomes a citizen at birth 
if the mother was physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the 
child’s birth. Because Morales-Santana’s father did not satisfy the 
statutory requirements for unwed citizen fathers, the immigration 
judge ruled that Morales-Santana was deportable.
In 2010, Morales-Santana fi led a motion to reopen his application, 
arguing that the differential treatment of unwed U.S.-citizen 
mothers and fathers under immigration law violated equal 
protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found Morales-
Santana’s arguments for derivative citizenship unpersuasive and 
denied the motion.
Lynch v. Morales-Santana 
Docket No. 15-1191
Argument Date: November 9, 2016
From: The Second Circuit
by Alan Raphael and Grace Urban
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Chicago, IL
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic to an unwed U.S.-citizen father and a 
Dominican mother. After living as a lawful permanent resident in the United States for decades, Morales-
Santana was convicted on felony charges, thus triggering deportation proceedings. Under immigration law 
at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, his father needed to have lived in the U.S. for at least 10 years—
5 or more of which followed the father’s fourteenth birthday—in order for Morales-Santana to be born 
a U.S. citizen. Because Morales-Santana’s father left Puerto Rico 20 days before turning nineteen years 
old, he could not transmit citizenship at birth to his son. Under the same law, an unwed citizen mother 
could transmit citizenship to her child if she lived in the United States for a year at any time prior to the 
child’s birth. Morales-Santana argued that his equal protection rights were violated by the law’s gender 
distinction and that the rule applicable to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers should apply to unwed citizen fathers 
as well. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and overturned the deportation order, fi nding that 
applying the standard for unwed citizen mothers made Morales-Santana a U.S. citizen. The Supreme Court 
will determine whether the differential treatment of U.S.-citizen mothers and fathers violates the Fifth 
Amendment and whether the appellate court had the authority to grant Morales-Santana citizenship.
I M M I G R AT I O N  L AW
Is It Constitutional to Treat an Unwed U.S.-Citizen Father Differently from 
an Unwed U.S.-Citizen Mother for the Purpose of Transmitting 
Citizenship to His Foreign-Born Child?
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Morales-Santana appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, which held that the gender distinction in 
§ 1409(c) was unconstitutional. It applied to him the standard 
applicable to the child of an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, thus 
granting Morales-Santana citizenship. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 
792 F.3d 256 (2nd Cir. 2015). The court reasoned that because the 
different classification of unwed citizen mothers and fathers under 
§ 1409(c) was not substantially related to the achievement of an 
important government objective, the distinction violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law.
Notably, the Second Circuit distinguished the case from Nguyen 
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), in which the Supreme Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny and held it was constitutional to require a 
U.S.-citizen father to take an affirmative step of either legitimating 
his child or obtaining a court order of paternity to confer derivative 
citizenship on his foreign-born child, but not to require mothers to 
do so. The Supreme Court reasoned that the law was constitutional 
because it served important objectives that were substantially 
related to the government’s interest in facilitating a relationship 
between the citizen parent and his child. In addition, the law 
imposed minimal obligations on citizen fathers. In contrast, the 
Second Circuit reasoned, the differential treatment of unwed citizen 
fathers in § 1409(c) was not rooted in the important government 
interests of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship 
existed and ensuring that the child and citizen parent had the 
potential to develop a real, meaningful relationship. Therefore, it 
did not satisfy the intermediate scrutiny standard of review and was 
unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider (1) 
whether Congress’s imposition of different physical presence 
requirements for unwed citizen mothers and unwed citizen fathers 
of children born outside the United States violated equal protection, 
and (2) whether the Second Circuit erred in conferring United 
States citizenship on Morales-Santana, despite no express statutory 
authority to do so.
CASE ANALYSIS
This is the fourth case in 20 years in which the Supreme Court has 
grappled with the question of whether immigration law provisions 
regarding transmission of citizenship to a child born outside 
the United States and outside of marriage may place greater 
requirements on citizen fathers than on citizen mothers. Most 
recently, in Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011), the 
Court deadlocked on this question. Only eight justices voted in that 
case because Justice Kagan recused herself. Although the Court 
currently has only eight members because of the unfilled vacancy 
created by Justice Scalia’s death, the lineup of justices is different 
than it was in Flores-Villar because Justice Kagan will be hearing 
the case and Justice Scalia is no longer on the Court.
First, there is disagreement about the standard of review the Court 
should apply. Normally, when a law that treats people differently 
based on their gender is challenged, courts utilize intermediate 
scrutiny to assess whether the law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. In order for a law to pass the intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review: (1) the government classification must serve an 
important government objective and (2) the discriminatory means 
employed must be substantially related to the achievement of that 
objective. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 
(1982). Moreover, the government’s justification for treating people 
differently based on their gender must be genuine; it must have 
been the real reason the law was enacted and cannot be based on 
stereotypes about men and women. United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996). 
However, the United States asserts that the Court should apply 
the more deferential standard of rational basis review. To survive 
rational basis review, a law simply needs to be rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest. United States v. Carolene Products, 
304 U.S. 144 (1938). The government argues this is the proper 
standard to apply because the U.S. Constitution gives Congress 
the power to make decisions about citizenship and naturalization. 
Therefore, deference should be given to Congress’s determination of 
which foreign-born citizens should be considered U.S. citizens. Yet, 
even if the Court in the current case applies intermediate scrutiny 
instead of rational basis, the government argues § 1409(c) should 
be upheld because the different categories of foreign-born children 
at issue and their U.S.-citizen parents are not similarly situated to 
each other. 
Second, the government argues that Congress’s decision to impose 
stricter requirements on unmarried U.S.-citizen fathers is based 
on its legitimate interest in ensuring there is a sufficiently strong 
connection between the child and the United States. In Nguyen, 
the Supreme Court held that (1) assuring a biological parent-
child relationship existed and (2) ensuring that the child and 
the citizen parent had a demonstrated opportunity to develop a 
relationship consisting of real, everyday ties, thus providing a 
connection between the parent and the child, and the child and 
the United States, are important government interests. Because 
the law’s gender-based distinction was substantially related to the 
government’s interests, it was held constitutional. In the current 
case, the United States contends that the different requirements 
for transmitting citizenship based on the nationalities of the child’s 
parents embodies the government’s interest in ensuring there is 
an established connection between a child born abroad and the 
United States. Because a child born abroad who has two U.S.-citizen 
parents is not subject to competing claims of national allegiance, 
Congress does not require as strong a connection to the United 
States as it does from a child born abroad to a U.S.-citizen parent 
and a noncitizen parent.
Third, the government argues it has an additional interest 
in preserving § 1409(c)’s gender distinctions: preventing 
statelessness. Unlike the United States, many countries determine 
a child’s citizenship at birth through that child’s blood relationship 
to his or her parent, rather than the child’s place of birth. In nearly 
all these jus sanguinis countries, the only legally recognized parent 
at birth is the mother. If a child was born to an unwed U.S.-citizen 
mother in a jus sanguinis country, the country would refuse 
citizenship to the child because the mother was not a citizen of 
the country. Thus, if U.S. law did not allow the child to acquire 
U.S. citizenship from the mother at birth, the child would be at 
significant risk of being born stateless. The child would have no 
nationality until the father legally established paternity, which may 
never happen.
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Lastly, the United States argues that unwed U.S.-citizen fathers 
and unwed U.S.-citizen mothers are not similarly situated in their 
relationship to a child born abroad out of wedlock, and therefore  
§ 1409(c) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. As the Court 
explained in Nguyen, “the fact of parenthood” is established for 
an unwed mother at the moment of her child’s birth. She clearly 
knows of the child’s existence and typically has immediate custody. 
However, an unwed father has no legal relationship to his child until 
he takes the affirmative step of legitimating that child, and may not 
even know the child exists when the child is born. 
Regarding the appropriate remedy, the United States argues that 
if the Court finds § 1409(c)’s gender distinction unconstitutional, 
then it should not apply the standard applicable to unwed U.S.-
citizen mothers to U.S.-citizen fathers because to do so would 
exceed the Court’s authority. Only Congress has the authority to 
grant citizenship, the government asserts. The appropriate remedy 
is to apply the standard applicable to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers 
to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers. Therefore, even if § 1409(c) is 
found unconstitutional, Morales-Santana still is not a citizen and is 
deportable.
Morales-Santana asks the Court to affirm the Second Circuit 
decision. In his view, the appellate court was correct in using 
intermediate scrutiny to decide the case. Morales-Santana further 
argues that the lower court granted the appropriate remedy of 
applying the standard for U.S.-citizen mothers to Morales-Santana’s 
father and thereby finding Morales-Santana was a citizen from birth 
and thus not subject to deportation. The gender distinctions in the 
statute, he contends, simply reflect outmoded gender stereotypes 
and assumptions of the closeness of the mother-child bond rather 
than being based on the goals asserted by the United States—of 
preventing statelessness and ensuring the existence of a connection 
between the child born outside the country and the United States. 
Further, he asserts that the discriminatory provision did not 
substantially advance those rationales and that there were available 
gender-neutral alternatives to accomplish those purposes. He argues 
that there is neither logic nor any explanation by the government 
as to why the child’s connection to the United States would be 
established by the mother having lived in the United States for 
1 year but would not be established by the father unless he had 
lived there for 10 years, including 4 years after attaining the age of 
fourteen. 
Regarding the appropriate remedy for the equal protection violation, 
Morales-Santana argues that the appellate court correctly extended 
the more lenient physical presence requirement to him because 
precedent favors “leveling up rather than leveling down.” Second, 
he argues that the government’s purported rationales for the 
residency requirements would be better accomplished by applying 
the more lenient terms applicable to mothers rather than the more 
demanding rules applicable to fathers. 
SIGNIFICANCE
The major impact of applying a high level of scrutiny to gender 
distinctions in laws and government programs is that few such 
distinctions have survived that scrutiny, particularly if the 
distinction is held to reflect stereotypes about women and their 
roles in the economy or in families. This standard, embodied in 
Mississippi University of Women v. Hogan and United States v. 
Virginia, is highly suspicious of gender distinctions in laws and 
requires the government to show “an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for their actions.” However, the Court has upheld some 
gender distinctions as constitutional, either without referring to 
the general standard or by holding that they satisfy the standard of 
intermediate scrutiny. This case addresses only one provision of 
naturalization law and applies only to children born at a time when 
the statute made the gender distinction applicable in this case, but 
the decision may have the effect of narrowing, perhaps substantially, 
the situations in which the Court will find that real biological 
differences between the genders justify differential treatment.
Nguyen is one of the rare cases in which the Court has allowed 
men and women to be treated differently under the law, and its 
rationale is that such differences in treatment by the INA reflects 
biological differences between the genders. The Nguyen conclusion 
that a mother can be assumed to be a child’s parent may well reflect 
a biological difference that the law may take into account, but the 
Court’s determination that giving birth establishes that the mother 
has a greater opportunity to establish a relationship with the 
child than does the father appears to reflect stereotypes normally 
unacceptable under equal protection analysis.
Neither the appellate court opinion nor the respondent ask the 
Court to overturn Nguyen, but rather they assert that Nguyen can 
be distinguished because the present case does not involve the 
biological question of identifying a child’s paternity. Instead, it deals 
with the ability of a citizen parent having a child with a noncitizen 
outside the United States to transmit citizenship to a child upon 
birth. The Court may determine whether this situation involves 
biological differences as in Nguyen or whether instead it deals with 
a nonbiological issue so the gender distinction was properly struck 
down by the Second Circuit opinion.
There has been substantial scholarly criticism of Nguyen as 
watering down the intermediate scrutiny standard even when 
the government interests could have been met by a gender-
neutral statute. Almost certainly this case will show divisions in 
the approaches of the justices. Some may hold that substantial 
deference should be given to Congress in crafting the terms of 
immigration and naturalization law, and possibly that rational basis 
should be the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the 
law rather than the more rigorous intermediate review. Some may 
see the result dictated by Nguyen, while others likely will hold that 
Morales-Santana’s equal protection rights were violated.
The second important issue, reached only if the Court finds an equal 
protection violation, is the proper remedy. In Miller v. Albright, 523 
U.S. 420 (1998), Justices Scalia and Thomas asserted that the Court 
could not grant citizenship to an individual, so applying the less 
demanding standard applicable to citizen mothers to citizen fathers 
would be inappropriate. Whether that view is held by any justice 
currently on the Court other than Justice Thomas is unknown. Equal 
protection requires equal treatment but does not specify the nature 
of the treatment, which is a judgment left to Congress. Given that 
the Constitution vests plenary power in Congress to make laws 
regarding naturalization, the Court may be reluctant to extend 
citizenship to the respondent even if it finds that his due process 
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rights were violated. The key issue for the Court will be to determine 
the congressional intent, which may be difficult to ascertain. On 
the other hand, most findings of equal protection violations in the 
past have led to the extension of the more inclusive or generous 
provision to those whose rights were violated. This discussion, if 
reached by the Court, may have important consequences regarding 
the fashioning of remedies in many future equal protection cases in 
areas far beyond the narrow question presented in this case.
Alan Raphael is a member of the faculty of Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law and teaches criminal procedure and 
constitutional law. He can be reached at araphael@luc.edu. Grace 
Urban is a student at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
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F A L S E  C L A I M S  A C T
What Standard Governs the Dismissal of a Relator’s Claim for Violation 
of the False Claims Act’s Seal Requirement in an Action Over 
Hurricane Katrina-Related Insurance Payments?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
In the aftermath of the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Cori and Kerri Rigsby accused 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company of falsely misclassifying wind damage as ﬂ ood damage, among 
other misdeeds, leaving a federal government-backed ﬂ ood insurance policy to unnecessarily pay wind 
damage as ﬂ ood damage out of United States Government funds. In 2006, the Rigsbys brought suit against 
State Farm under the federal False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA imposes civil liability on any person who 
submits false or fraudulent claims to the federal government for payment or approval. “Relators,” like the 
Rigsbys, may bring actions under the FCA for themselves and for the government. If a lawsuit initiated by 
a relator under the FCA results in civil penalties or the recovery of damages, the award is typically divided 
between the government and the relator. In 2011, a federal district court in Mississippi awarded the 
Rigsbys the maximum possible share under the FCA for proving a false claim upon the federal government 
of $250,000. The court also awarded the Rigsbys over $2.9 million in attorney’s fees and expenses. 
State Farm’s appeal from the award seeks to undermine the result based on disclosure violations that 
the company attributes to the Rigsbys, including violations by the attorneys who initially represented the 
Rigsbys, of an FCA requirement that claims fi rst be fi led “under seal,” and not disclosed until allowed 
under the FCA. This case calls upon the Supreme Court to address how a relator’s seal violation affects 
a relator’s right to prosecute and recover for FCA claims and what discretion judges have to police such 
violations. Relators play a signifi cant role in the instigation of FCA cases. Relator cases are reported to 
have led to $2.9 billion in FCA recoveries in 2015. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. United States, ex rel. Rigsby
Docket No. 15-513
Argument Date: November 1, 2016
From: The Fifth Circuit
by Michael Kurs
Pullman & Comley, LLC, Hartford, CT
ISSUE
What standard governs the dismissal of a relator’s claim for violation 
of the False Claims Act’s seal requirement, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)?
FACTS
Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005. More 
than 1,800 people died as severe winds and fl oods wracked 
Gulf communities. Many of the homeowners who lost homes or 
experienced damage had insurance coverage under at least two 
policies, often issued by the same insurance company. One policy 
covered fl ood-caused damage and excluded wind damage. The other 
covered wind-caused damage and excluded fl ood damage. A private 
insurance company frequently administered both policies, with 
wind damages paid from the insurance company’s assets and fl ood 
policies paid with government funds through a Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) program. The insurers took a fee for 
administering the FEMA program policy.
Cori and Kerri Rigsby, both certifi ed and experienced adjusters, 
and sisters, worked as claims adjusters on Katrina-related claims 
for a contractor of the State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. The 
Rigsbys came to believe that State Farm, and others, deliberately 
overpaid fl ood insurance claims in order to reduce their own 
exposure for wind damage. According to Kerri Rigsby, after Katrina, 
State Farm trainers told its adjusters that they would see “water 
damage.” “The wind wasn’t that strong. You are not going to see a 
lot of wind damage. If you see substantial damage, it will be from 
water.” The Rigsbys also alleged State Farm trainers told adjusters 
that Katrina was a “water storm” and that “all major damage to 
homes was caused by fl ooding.” State Farm additionally allegedly 
told the adjusters to “hit the limits” of fl ood policies and “to 
manipulate the totals” to ensure that policy limits were reached.
A few weeks after Katrina, Kerri Rigsby and another adjuster for 
State Farm inspected a home in Biloxi, Mississippi, covered by two 
State Farm insurance policies—a FEMA-backed policy that excluded 
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wind damage and a State Farm policy excluding flood damage. The 
two adjusters assumed that flooding caused the primary damage to 
the house and did not do a line-by-line estimate of the damage. The 
State Farm supervisor approved a maximum flood damage payout. 
State Farm subsequently retained an engineering company to 
analyze the damage. The engineering company’s report concluded 
the damage to have been primarily caused by wind.
State Farm refused to pay for the report and withheld the report 
from the FEMA insurance program file. A State Farm supervisor put 
a note on the report indicating the bill should not be paid and the 
report should not be discussed. State Farm arranged for a second 
report. The second report determined that, although wind damage 
had occurred, water caused the primary damage to the house. 
There was evidence that the State Farm supervisor pressured the 
engineering company to issue reports finding flood damage at the 
risk of losing contracts with State Farm. The engineer who had 
concluded wind had caused the damage to the home lost his job. 
Kerri Rigsby maintained that she never before saw instructions 
similar to those she found on the engineer’s report. In her 
experience it was unprecedented to have two engineering reports 
on a single property, and it was also unusual to see an engineering 
report prepared just two days after the engineer inspected the 
property, as was the case with the second report.
These events, among others, led the Rigsbys to believe that State 
Farm unlawfully had sought to maximize its policyholders flood 
claims to minimize wind claims at the federal government’s 
expense. The United States reimbursed State Farm for Katrina claim 
payments made to settle flood policy claims. The payments State 
Farm had to make to cover wind payments under its homeowner 
policies fell to State Farm to pay from its own accounts.
The Rigsbys supplied copies of documents to state and federal law 
enforcement about the claim settlement practices that concerned 
them. When they disclosed to their employer what they had done, 
the employer terminated them. The employer also sued them for 
taking the documents.
The Rigsbys undertook a lawsuit under the federal False Claims 
Act, often referred to as the FCA. The FCA provides a mechanism 
for the federal government to recover for false or fraudulent claims 
presented to the government for payment or approval. The FCA 
allows the United States Attorney General to bring lawsuits to 
enforce the FCA. Individuals may also bring suits “for the United 
States Government” with some limitations, and receive a percentage 
of the recovery. The suits are commonly called qui tam suits—
actions brought by “an informer,” under a statute that establishes a 
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act. 
The Rigsbys’ lawyers abided by the FCA’s requirement at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b) that requires the filing of the complaint with the court, in 
camera, and under seal (unavailable to the public or any defendant), 
for at least 60 days, and not served on any defendant until the 
court so orders. They filed the complaint on April 26, 2006, with 
the case name becoming United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby and Kerri 
Rigsby v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, et al. The United 
States moved to extend the sealing period to allow the government 
additional time to decide whether to intervene in the action. The 
federal district court granted the request and issued subsequent 
orders further extending the sealing period. The court partially 
lifted the seal in January 2007 to allow the Rigsbys to make certain 
disclosures in another case in Alabama and fully lifted the seal 
on August 1, 2007. The government did not intervene, leaving the 
Rigsbys to pursue the case on their own through their lawyers.
Between April 2006 and January 2007, the Rigsbys and the attorneys 
who also represented them in other litigation against State Farm, 
made many public statements against State Farm in which they 
alleged company misconduct in its claims adjustment practices. 
The attorneys (Richard Scruggs, and other lawyers associated with 
the Scruggs Law Firm and the participants in the Scruggs Katrina 
Group, a joint venture of a number of Mississippi attorneys) also 
served as the attorneys for a large number of individual property 
owners making claims against State Farm and other insurers named 
in the Rigsbys’ original FCA complaint, so they did not speak just on 
the Rigsbys’ behalf.
The ABC news magazine 20/20 subsequently included a segment 
containing excerpts of interviews with the Rigsbys. In the 
interviews, the Rigsbys discussed their accusation that State Farm 
had mischaracterized wind damage as water damage to avoid paying 
legitimate policyholder claims. But the program did not specifically 
disclose the existence of the FCA suit.
State Farm brought three instances to the federal trial court’s 
attention that had occurred prior to the date of the partial unsealing 
when the attorneys for the Rigsbys, who no longer represent them, 
revealed the facts alleged in and the existence of the pending 
FCA case. The instances all involved disclosure of the document 
entitled “Relators Evidentiary Disclosures Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3130.” Senior District Judge L.T. Senter Jr. of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern 
Division, found the other disclosures identified by State Farm, 
that he considered relevant, to “reflect, to one degree or another, 
disclosures and discussions of the underlying facts, but they contain 
no disclosure of the existence of the FCA action.” The judge focused 
on the 3 disclosures, out of 49 claimed by State Farm, since he 
concluded that the court mooted the original seal of the qui tam case 
by partially lifting the seal on January 1, 2007, to allow disclosures in 
the Alabama case, without specifying that the Alabama disclosures 
be made under seal. 
Judge Senter noted that Attorney Richard Scruggs’s assistant had 
sent a pleading from the FCA case to an ABC News representative 
on July 28, 2006 (three months after the filing of the FCA case). In 
August 2006, Attorney Scruggs sent what appeared to be another 
copy of the FCA evidentiary disclosures to an AP employee. 
(Judge Senter’s opinion does not specify whether “AP” refers to 
the Associated Press). Scruggs’s assistant also sent a copy of the 
evidentiary disclosures to the New York Times in September 2006.
The judge commented: “It is abundantly clear that Richard Scruggs 
and the SKG [the joint venture of Mississippi attorneys who 
represented the Rigsbys as well] used formidable public relations 
resources … in an effort to control the public perception of the case 
at the heart of this qui tam action. …” He also concluded that the 
attorneys were not free to disclose the existence of the qui tam case. 
But he distinguished between the attorneys’ efforts to publicize the 
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claim that State Farm deliberately mischaracterized wind damage 
as flood damage in assessing claims under the insurance policies 
it was adjusting and the “improper disclosures” of the Rigsbys qui 
tam action. According to Judge Senter, “[a]s far as the wind damage 
claims are concerned, these attorneys were acting well within their 
rights as advocates for their clients who had home owner policy 
claims.” 
But Judge Senter ruled that the record of the case before him did 
not show that the government’s ability to investigate the Rigsbys’ 
allegations had been compromised. He also noted that, although 
the government declined to intervene in the case, it did not disclose 
the reasons for its decision and the government had not filed 
any pleadings that he could use to determine the extent of the 
damage, if any, that the government believes it sustained. Judge 
Senter additionally found no evidence that the prepartial unsealing 
disclosures made by the attorneys to the media had led to a public 
disclosure by the media that the action had been filed.
The judge determined, too, that the Rigsbys personal role in making 
the disclosures “was not an active one.” Judge Senter ruled that 
while a client is “responsible for the actions taken by his attorney,” 
there was no showing that the Rigsbys initiated the three improper 
disclosures and no basis to conclude that the Rigsbys had acted 
willfully or in bad faith.
The judge did not find any cases decided by the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the circuit that handles appeals from the federal court in 
which the case was litigated, dealing directly with the issue State 
Farm had raised. He cited a Ninth Circuit case that says a violation 
of the sealing requirements does not require dismissal of a qui 
tam complaint in all circumstances. He acknowledged the Sixth 
Circuit employs a per se rule that failure to abide by the FCA sealing 
requirements requires dismissal of the complaint, “but no other 
circuit court has adopted this per se rule.” Judge Senter noted other 
cases, as well, including a Second Circuit case, for the proposition 
that failure to file an FCA complaint under seal and to observe other 
procedural requirements of the FCA may support a district court’s 
exercise of discretion “to impose the sanction of dismissal.” 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Senter’s decision to 
employ his discretion to reject State Farm’s arguments that the court 
should dismiss the Rigsbys’ FCA case. The Fifth Circuit’s decision 
contains other rulings favorable to the Rigsbys including rulings on 
State Farm’s motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. The lower court had granted the Rigsbys a 30 percent 
share of the $758,250 award against State Farm and $2,913,228.69 in 
attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Fifth Circuit’s decision reversed 
a ruling that would have deprived the Rigsbys of obtaining other 
information through further proceedings to support additional FCA 
claims against State Farm. 
The Fifth Circuit in reviewing the case noted the jury’s conclusion 
that the government had suffered damages under the FCA as a 
result of State Farm’s submission of false flood claims and of a 
“false record.” It reasoned that whether a violation of the FCA’s 
seal requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) “compels dismissal,” 
presents a statutory interpretation question. 
The circuit court ruled: “While cognizant of the justification for 
and the merits of a per se rule, we conclude that a seal violation 
does not automatically mandate dismissal.” As the Ninth Circuit 
recognized in Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 67 F.3d 242 (9th Cir. 
1995) “and the government stated as amicus in this case, nothing in 
the text of § 3730(b)(2) explicitly authorizes dismissal as a sanction 
for disclosures in violation of the seal requirement” (Internal 
quotations omitted). Also, “the 1986 amendments [that added the 
seal provision] to the FCA were intended to encourage more, not 
fewer private FCA actions.”
In applying, the Lujan analysis of the appropriate sanction for 
violations, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the factors of (1) the harm to 
the government from the violations; (2) the nature of the violations; 
and (3) whether the violations were made willfully or in bad faith. 
The court agreed with the district court’s assessment that none of 
the disclosures looked to have resulted in the publication of the 
existence of the lawsuit before the court partially lifted the seal. 
“If State Farm was not tipped off about the existence of the suit 
from the Rigsbys’ disclosures, a fundamental purpose of the seal 
requirement—allowing the government to determine whether to 
join the suit without tipping off a defendant—was not imperiled.”
The court commented that there was, “no indication that the 
Rigsbys themselves communicated the existence of the suit in the 
relevant interviews. Were we to impute their former attorneys’ 
disclosures to them, however, we would conclude that they acted 
in bad faith.” But “[e]ven presuming bad faith, the Lujan factors 
favor the Rigsbys. Although they violated the seal requirement, the 
Rigsbys’ breaches do not merit dismissal.”
State Farm now seeks to convince the Supreme Court that the 
Rigsbys repeatedly and willfully violated the seal requirement and 
that the matter presents “an unprecedented, flagrant disregard for 
the seal provision—all aimed at generating hostile media coverage 
as a litigation tactic against petitioner State Farm.”
CASE ANALYSIS
State Farm asserts that “the text, structure, history and purpose 
of the FCA’s seal provision support a bright-line rule that a seal 
violation merits dismissal of a private relator from an FCA case.” It 
maintains that a relator’s involvement in a case is conditioned upon 
“a series of mandatory statutory perquisites, including compliance 
with the seal requirement.” Also, even if the Court rejects a rule 
of mandatory dismissal, the Court should reverse or vacate the 
decision below in light of the “egregious conduct” involved in the 
case. State Farm argues that the considerations supporting this 
result include “the avalanche of unfavorable publicity that was 
undeniably damaging to State Farm’s reputation.”
As factual background, State Farm notes that Richard Scruggs 
withdrew as the Rigsbys’ attorney “after he was indicted in 
November 2007 for conspiring to bribe a Mississippi state judge.” 
Also, Scruggs paid the Rigsbys annual salaries of $150,000 a year 
as consultants. State Farm quotes a District Court of Alabama 
finding that: “Scruggs was the alter ego of the Rigsbys, and the 
Rigsbys were the alter egos of Scruggs. They could not have been 
any more closely ‘identified’ without obtaining a marriage license.” 
State Farm also draws the Court’s attention to “video, photographs 
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and other evidence … that Hurricane Katrina had inundated” the 
McIntosh house [the home that was the subject of the Rigsbys’ 
misclassified claims case] with approximately five feet of flood 
water.”
The Rigsbys’ response to State Farm’s position is that the FCA 
does not specify a consequence if a relator or her attorney violates 
a seal order. They indicate “the ordinary rule—embraced by the 
vast majority of courts that have considered the question—is that 
district courts have discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction.” 
They submit that dismissal ought to be the last resort because it 
impairs the government’s interest in recovering damages for fraud 
upon the government.
They emphasize that the fraud they discovered was proven before 
a jury. The attorneys who violated the seal order did so without the 
Rigsbys knowledge or consent and that those attorneys have been 
disqualified from the case. The Rigsbys assert the government 
now stands to “recover billions.” (The district court trial addressed 
the fraud claims for one property leaving open the opportunity 
for further proceedings on other claims). The Rigsbys argue, 
“dismissal would award a proven fraudster while punishing the 
government and the innocent relators—even though the violations 
prejudiced nobody, and even though the actual violators will suffer 
no consequence.” “Because dismissal would be unjust, unwise and 
inconsistent with Congress’s design in enacting the FCA, this Court 
should affirm.”
The United States has filed a brief as amicus curiae supporting 
the Rigsbys. It notes: nothing in the FCA suggests that Congress 
intended to punish every seal violation through the extreme 
sanction of dismissal of the relator’s suit. The text reflects the 
opposite expectation. “Congress expressly mandated dismissal 
in particular circumstances, but it declined to do so in the seal 
provision.” The United States supports the application of the 
standards applied by the court of appeals. It urges the Court to affirm 
the court of appeals for reasons including that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in deciding the case. There is reason to 
anticipate that the government’s reasoning and its support of the 
Rigsbys’ positions and the positions of the district court and circuit 
court who have considered the Rigsbys’ case may be enough to tip 
the scales in favor of the affirmance.
SIGNIFICANCE
The FCA’s reach extends to “any person.” The Rigsbys report 
that the vast majority of FCA cases are filed by relators who have 
facilitated enforcement of the statute since its enactment in 1863. 
Changes to the act have encouraged more private enforcement 
suits. The Rigsbys cite to United States Justice Department 
Fraud Statistics that indicate the government recovered over $3.5 
billion under the statute in 2015, with $2.9 billion coming from 
whistleblower/relator lawsuits. 
As with the Rigsbys case, which is now in its eleventh year, 
charges of government fraud can engender long and burdensomely 
expensive litigation for all parties involved, sometimes under the 
spotlight of national media attention. The landscape of obligations 
concerning speaking or otherwise communicating about cases 
under seal is complicated by case law that protects disclosures of 
underlying allegations but not the existence of an FCA lawsuit while 
it is under seal. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F. 
3d 245 (4th Cir. 2011). The prospects of a partial unsealing mooting 
a sealing order, as the trial and court of appeals found to have 
occurred in this case, means the government and parties faced with 
partial unsealing orders should consider the parameters of such 
orders carefully when proposed and once adopted.
The Supreme Court’s decision, at the least, should resolve the split 
in the circuits about whether dismissals for seal violations are 
mandatory. (State Farm refers to the split as a three-way split with 
the Second and Fourth, the Sixth, and the Ninth Circuits being the 
circuit courts that have addressed the issue.) Of course, Congress 
is free to address the question itself, if dissatisfied with the Court’s 
ruling. Battling fraud against the government tends to be a priority 
regardless of which party controls.
Michael Kurs is a partner in the law firm of Pullman & Comley, 
LLC, resident in its Hartford, Connecticut, office. He is a member 
of the firm’s litigation, health law, and regulatory practices. He can 
be reached at mkurs@pullcom.com or 860-424-4331. The sources 
for the information contained in this article include district court 
decisions found at 2009 WL 2461733, 2011 WL 8107251, the circuit 
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C I V I L  R I G H T S
Does a Public School Student with an Individualized Education Program Under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Have to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies Under That Act Before Bringing a Suit in Federal Court Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
E.F. was born with cerebral palsy. She had an Individualized Education Program under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, and she had an independent prescription for a service dog to help increase her 
mobility. E.F.’s school refused to allow her to bring her service dog to school, however, and she sued in 
federal court for monetary damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools 
Docket No. 15-497 
Argument Date: October 31, 2016
From: The Sixth Circuit 
by Steven D. Schwinn
The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL
INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires a person 
who wishes to complain about an Individualized Education Program 
to exhaust administrative remedies before fi ling a case in federal 
court if they seek relief that is “also available under the [Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act].” Here, E.F.’s suit sought monetary 
damages for the school’s refusal to allow her to bring her service 
dog to school. The parties disagree over whether this kind of relief 
is “also available under the [Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act],” and therefore whether E.F. had to exhaust administrative 
remedies before fi ling her suit in federal court.
ISSUE
Did E.F. have to exhaust administrative remedies under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act before she fi led her suit 
in federal court for damages under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and the Rehabilitation Act?
FACTS
E.F., the daughter of Stacy and Brent Fry, was born with cerebral 
palsy. The condition signifi cantly limits E.F.’s motor skills and 
mobility, but it imposes no cognitive impairment. 
In 2009, when E.F. was fi ve years old, her physician prescribed 
a service dog to increase her physical mobility. E.F. obtained a 
Goldendoodle named Wonder. Wonder was trained and certifi ed to 
help E.F. with a variety of functions, including retrieving dropped 
items, helping E.F. balance when she used her walker, opening and 
closing doors, turning on and off lights, removing her coat, and 
helping E.F. transfer to and from the toilet. 
In October 2009, when Wonder’s training was complete, the 
Napoleon Community Schools and the Jackson County Intermediate 
School District (together, the District) refused to allow E.F. to 
bring Wonder to school. The District said that E.F. already had an 
Individualized Education Program (IEP) under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) that included a human aide 
to provide one-on-one support for E.F. during the school day. The 
District said that because E.F. already had a human aide at school, 
she was receiving the required “free and appropriate education” 
(FAPE) under the IDEA, and did not need Wonder. As a result, E.F. 
attended school without Wonder from October 2009 to April 2010.
After mediation between E.F.’s attorneys and the District, the 
District changed course slightly and allowed E.F. to bring Wonder 
to school for a 30-day trial period, starting on April 12, 2010, and 
“extend[ing] through the end of the school year.” But the District 
refused to allow E.F. to use Wonder as a service dog. Instead, 
Wonder had to remain at the back of the room during classes and 
“was forbidden from assisting [E.F.] with many tasks he had been 
specifi cally trained to do.” The District similarly refused to allow E.F. 
to use Wonder at recess, during lunch, during computer lab, and in 
the library; and the District refused to allow Wonder to accompany 
E.F. to major school activities, such as fi eld day and the school play. 
After this trial period, the District readopted its previous position 
and refused to let Wonder attend school at all. The Fry family then 
pulled E.F. from the District and homeschooled her for the next two 
years. 
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In July 2010, the Frys filed a complaint with the U.S. Department 
of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR), alleging that the 
District violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to allow E.F. to use Wonder at 
school. The OCR investigated the complaint and, in May 2012, 
issued a decision concluding that the District violated the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act. The OCR noted that the District’s obligations 
under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are broader than merely 
providing a FAPE under the IDEA. In particular, the OCR said that 
the antidiscrimination provisions in the ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act required the District to allow E.F. to use Wonder in order to 
allow her to function independently at school, irrespective of the 
FAPE calculation under the IDEA. The OCR explained that “a 
school district would violate the antidiscrimination requirements 
if it required a student who used a wheelchair to be carried or if it 
required a blind student to be led through the classroom by holding 
the arm of his teacher instead of permitting the student to use a 
service animal or a cane.”
In response to the OCR report, the District agreed to allow E.F. 
to attend school with Wonder starting in the fall of 2012. (The 
District continued to deny liability, however, and refused to provide 
compensation for the period when it did not allow Wonder to attend 
school.) But after E.F.’s father discussed arrangements with the 
school principal, E.F.’s parents developed “serious concerns that the 
administration would resent [E.F.] and make her return to school 
difficult.” The Frys then removed E.F. from the District and placed 
her in a neighboring school district.
In December 2012, the Frys filed suit in federal court, arguing that 
the District violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The suit 
sought monetary damages for the District’s refusal to allow Wonder 
to attend school and assist E.F. between fall 2009 and spring 2012; it 
also sought declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees. The district court 
dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
under the IDEA. A divided panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and this appeal followed.
CASE ANALYSIS
Under the IDEA, a person who wishes to complain about an IEP has 
to exhaust an administrative complaint process before filing a suit 
in federal court, if they “seek[] relief that is also available” under 
the IDEA. This process includes a complaint to the local education 
agency, a “preliminary meeting” with parents and members of the 
IEP team, a “due process hearing” with a local education agency, 
and an appeal to a state education agency. The process gives the 
local experts the first crack at the complaint and a chance to resolve 
it. If they cannot resolve the complaint, the process allows the 
parties to develop a record before the case goes to a (less expert) 
federal court. 
In this case, E.F. filed an antidiscrimination claim in federal court 
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties agree that E.F. 
failed to exhaust the IDEA administrative process before filing suit. 
But they disagree whether she had to—that is, whether her federal 
court case “seek[s] relief that was also available” under the IDEA.
E.F. argues that her federal court case does not “seek[] relief that 
was also available” under the IDEA. (E.F. points out that Congress 
added this language to the IDEA in 1983 in Handicapped Children’s 
Protection Act (HCPA).) She claims that her federal court case seeks 
monetary damages for the time when the District refused to allow 
her to take Wonder to school, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees. 
But she says that the IDEA does not authorize any of these forms 
of relief. She claims that the IDEA only authorizes a challenge to 
the terms of the IEP itself, and that her federal court case does not 
seek a change to her IEP. Moreover, E.F. says that her federal court 
case is based on the District’s refusal to allow Wonder to help her 
to function independently at school with activities such as going to 
the bathroom (which sounds in the ADA and Rehabilitation Act), 
not to achieve a free and appropriate education (which would sound 
in the IDEA). (Indeed, E.F. does not contest the District’s claim that 
E.F. could learn just as well with a human aide. She says that this 
is irrelevant to her federal court case that challenges the District’s 
actions that restricted her from functioning independently.) E.F. 
contends that the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding otherwise by 
wrongly hypothesizing the relief that she could have sought, not the 
relief that she actually sought, in federal court.
E.F. argues next that she did not have to complain through the IDEA 
administrative process, because her complaint would have been 
futile. She says that the HCPA reaffirmed the rule in administrative 
law that exhaustion is not required when administrative 
proceedings cannot provide the relief that the plaintiff seeks. In 
particular, she says that the text, legislative history, and purpose 
of the HCPA all say that a person need not exhaust the IDEA’s 
administrative procedures when they would be futile. She contends 
that this principle applies here, because, again, she could not have 
received the relief she seeks in her federal court case through the 
IDEA administrative process.
Third, E.F. argues that her position would protect disabled 
children from having to exhaust burdensome and time-consuming 
processes under the IDEA in order to vindicate different statutory 
and constitutional rights. She says that the IDEA administrative 
process works well to allow children and parents an opportunity 
to challenge an IEP before local experts. But when children and 
parents seek to vindicate rights protected by other statutes, the 
IDEA administrative process serves only to delay their lawsuits. E.F. 
contends that Congress could, and did, conclude that the burdens of 
delay outweighed the benefits of the IDEA administrative process for 
cases like hers, which seek to vindicate other statutory rights.
(The government weighed in as amicus in support of E.F. and makes 
substantially similar arguments.)
The District argues that the IDEA requires E.F. to exhaust 
administrative remedies, because E.F. seeks damages that “in 
substance” are available under the IDEA. The District claims that 
statutory text, precedent, and context all show that the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement “turns on the substance and not the 
form of a plaintiff’s request for relief.” The District says that any 
other result would turn the exhaustion requirement into an empty 
formality, and that a plaintiff could dodge exhaustion simply by 
labeling a claim as one for “damages” (which are unavailable 
under the IDEA). The District contends that this would undermine 
Congress’s intent to ensure that parents and local experts, not 
the courts, have the first crack at resolving a dispute over an IEP. 
The District claims moreover that every court of appeals that has 
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addressed the question “has agreed that the form of a plaintiff’s 
prayer for relief is immaterial.” 
The District argues next that E.F. gives no reason for supporting a 
formalist reading of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The District 
says that the cases that E.F. cites support the opposite conclusion, 
and that the government itself took the opposite position in a case 
five years ago at the Ninth Circuit. The District contends that “the 
sole purpose of [the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement] … is to 
require plaintiffs to exhaust claims brought under statutes other 
than the IDEA,” and that E.F. is wrong to say that she is exempt from 
exhaustion so long as a complaint does not allege an IDEA violation. 
The District claims that E.F. cannot avoid this result simply by 
conceding that the school did not violate the IDEA, because that 
conclusion “does not alter what relief the IDEA process could in fact 
provide [her].”
The District argues that E.F.’s claimed relief was available 
“in substance” under the IDEA, and that she therefore had to 
exhaust the IDEA administrative process. The District claims that 
IDEA administrators could order retroactive reimbursement for 
educational services that should have been rendered during the 
period when the District refused to permit E.F. to bring Wonder to 
school. The District says that IDEA administrators could similarly 
order declaratory relief that certain services (like Wonder) must be 
included in the IEP. And the District contends that E.F.’s request for 
“any other relief” seeks relief that is available under the IDEA. The 
District says that because all the forms of relief that E.F. requested 
are available “in substance” under the IDEA, she had to exhaust the 
IDEA’s administrative process before filing suit.
Finally, the District argues that E.F. waived her argument that 
exhaustion would be futile, because she failed to raise it in the 
lower courts. But in any event, the District says that there is no 
basis to excuse E.F.’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 
because IDEA administrators could award “in substance” the relief 
that E.F. seeks.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case comes down to a very simple question: How pliable is 
the IDEA’s phrase “seeking relief that is also available under [the 
IDEA]”? A ruling that the phrase is narrow and rigid (or, in the 
District’s words, “formalistic”) would mean that E.F. would likely 
win, because her claim for monetary damages is not “also available” 
under the IDEA. It would also mean that other individuals who seek 
to lodge a distinct statutory or constitutional claim while receiving 
an IEP could likely bypass the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion 
requirement and file directly in federal court. In short, a ruling that 
the phrase is narrow and rigid would make it easier for a person 
receiving an IEP to bring a distinct statutory or constitutional claim 
in federal court.
On the other hand, a ruling that the phrase is broad and elastic (or, 
in the District’s words, that it refers to relief that is “in substance” 
with the IDEA) would mean that E.F. could lose, because her claim 
for monetary damages might well be “in substance” with the IDEA. 
This kind of ruling would also mean that E.F. and other individuals 
who seek to lodge a distinct statutory or constitutional claim while 
receiving an IEP would have to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative 
process before bringing those claims in federal court.
This matters, because the administrative process can be 
burdensome and time-consuming. It can thus delay and even 
deter later federal court litigation. The process also shapes the 
administrative record that a federal court would rely upon if and 
when an individual brings the case to federal court—and thus 
shapes the litigation in federal court, and possibly the result. But at 
the same time, the administrative process can also give local experts 
a first chance to resolve an IEP conflict or issue in a less formal way, 
before it goes to (a less local, less expert, but more formal) federal 
court. 
Finally, this case will resolve a conflict in the circuits. At least six 
other courts of appeals align with the Sixth Circuit in reading the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement relatively broadly, and thus requiring 
exhaustion for children such as E.F. The Ninth Circuit alone has 
gone the other way and read the exhaustion requirement relatively 
narrowly. As E.F. wrote in her certiorari petition, “Had [she] brought 
this case in the Ninth Circuit, the court would not have dismissed it 
for failure to exhaust.”
Steven D. Schwinn is a professor of law at The John Marshall 
Law School and coeditor of the Constitutional Law Prof Blog. He 
specializes in constitutional law and human rights. He can be 
reached at sschwinn@jmls.edu or 312.386.2865.
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S E P A R AT I O N  O F  P O W E R S
Does the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 Prohibit a Person Serving 
as an Acting Offi cer from Continued Service as an Acting Offi cer Upon 
the President’s Nomination of That Person to the Permanent Offi ce, 
When That Person Has Not Served as a First Assistant?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 says that the President may temporarily fi ll a vacancy in an 
offi ce with an acting offi cer in one of three ways. First, by default, the vacancy may be fi lled by the fi rst 
assistant to the offi ce. Alternatively, the President may appoint a senior offi cer from another agency to 
the offi ce. Alternatively, the President may appoint a senior offi cer from within the agency to the offi ce. 
But at the same time, the Act says that a person cannot serve as an acting offi cer and the permanent 
nominee unless that person served as the fi rst assistant to the offi ce for at least 90 of the last 365 days. 
This provision means that a person serving as an acting offi cer loses his or her authority upon nomination 
by the President to the permanent offi ce, unless that person satisfi es this condition. It also means that a 
President cannot simultaneously appoint a person as an acting offi cer and nominate that same person to 
the permanent offi ce, again unless that person satisfi es this condition.
National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc. 
Docket No. 15-1251
Argument Date: November 7, 2016 
From: The District of Columbia Circuit 
by Steven D. Schwinn
The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL
INTRODUCTION
In June 2010, President Obama appointed Lafe Solomon as Acting 
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 
Solomon previously served for 10 years as the Director of the 
National Labor Relations Board’s Offi ce of Representation Appeals, 
but he had not served as fi rst assistant to the General Counsel. 
President Obama nominated Solomon to the permanent offi ce on 
January 5, 2011, but the Senate returned the nomination without 
confi rming Solomon. 
In January 2013, while Solomon was serving as Acting General 
Counsel, an NLRB regional director, under authority delegated by 
the General Counsel, issued an unfair labor practice complaint 
against SW General, Inc. The company argued that the complaint 
was void, however, because Solomon lost his authority as Acting 
General Counsel when President Obama nominated him to the 
permanent offi ce, in January 2011.
ISSUE
Does the restriction in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 
which prohibits a person from serving as an acting offi cer and the 
permanent nominee unless that person meets certain conditions, 
apply when the President appoints a senior agency offi cer as the 
acting offi cer?
FACTS
In June 2010, President Obama appointed Lafe Solomon as Acting 
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. President 
Obama appointed Solomon, who by then had served for 10 years 
as the Director of the NLRB’s Offi ce of Representation Appeals, 
pursuant to his authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 
1998 (the FVRA). 
Solomon served continuously as Acting General Counsel for over 
three years, until November 4, 2013. During that time, President 
Obama twice nominated Solomon to be General Counsel, fi rst 
on January 5, 2011, and then again on May 24, 2013. The Senate 
returned the fi rst nomination, and President Obama withdrew the 
second nomination. President Obama ultimately nominated Richard 
Griffi n to the post, and the Senate confi rmed Griffi n on October 29, 
2013.
In January 2013, while Solomon was serving as Acting General 
Counsel, the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local I-60, 
AFL-CIO (the Union) brought an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge 
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against SW General, Inc. (Southwest) for violating a “Longevity Pay” 
provision in the collective bargaining agreement that guaranteed 
annual bonuses to Southwest employees who had been with the 
company for at least 10 years. After a hearing, an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) issued recommendations that Southwest committed a 
ULP. Southwest then filed exceptions to the ALJ’s recommendations, 
including a challenge arguing that the ULP complaint was invalid, 
because under the FVRA, Acting General Counsel Solomon could not 
legally perform the duties of the office after being nominated to fill 
that position permanently. In May 2014, the NLRB adopted the ALJ’s 
recommendation with minor changes, but the NLRB did not address 
Southwest’s FVRA argument.
Southwest appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit. The court agreed with Southwest that the FVRA 
prohibited Solomon from serving as Acting General Counsel from 
January 5, 2011, the first date that President Obama nominated 
him to the permanent position, and that Solomon therefore lacked 
authority to issue the ULP charge against Southwest. The court 
also ruled that neither the harmless-error doctrine nor the de 
facto officer doctrine rendered the ULP charge valid, regardless 
of whether Solomon’s appointment violated the FVRA. The court 
vacated the NLRB’s order. This appeal followed.
CASE ANALYSIS
The FVRA is a federal act (not to be confused with the Appointments 
Clause in the Constitution) that provides for immediately filling 
a vacancy with an acting officer in a position that, over the longer 
term, requires presidential nomination and Senate confirmation 
(a so-called PAS position). The Act provides for three ways to 
temporarily fill this kind of vacancy. First, § 3345(a)(1) of the FVRA 
says that by default the “first assistant” to the position automatically 
takes over in an acting capacity. Next, as an alternative, § 3345(a)
(2) says that the President can appoint a PAS officer from another 
agency to serve as the acting officer. Third, again as an alternative, 
§ 3345(a)(3) says that the President can appoint a senior employee 
from the same agency. 
But while these provisions give the President some flexibility in 
temporary appointments, the FVRA also contains some restrictions. 
In particular, § 3345(b)(1) says that “[n]otwithstanding [Section 
3345(a)(1)],” a person cannot serve as an acting officer and 
the permanent nominee unless that person served as the first 
assistant to the office for at least 90 of the last 365 days. (A separate 
provision, § 3345(b)(2), provides another exception for a person 
serving as a first assistant who was approved by the Senate. This 
separate provision, however, is not relevant to this case.) In other 
words, a person’s permanent nomination invalidates his or her 
appointment as an acting officer, unless the person meets this 
first-assistant condition. This provision is designed to prevent a 
president from gaming appointments by using last-minute first-
assistant designations to make individuals eligible for acting 
service. 
The FVRA has other restrictions, too. For example, the acting officer 
can only serve for 210 days and cannot become the permanent 
nominee for the position. Moreover, any action by an acting officer 
who serves in violation of the FVRA has no force or effect and may 
not be ratified by later valid action. In all these ways, the FVRA 
balances the President’s immediate need to cover vacancies in 
important positions in the short term with the Senate’s role in 
confirming a permanent officer over the long term. 
This case involves the FVRA’s application to the NLRB’s General 
Counsel, so we need to understand the basic nature of that office. 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the General Counsel of 
the NLRB must be appointed by the President, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The incumbent officer is primarily 
responsible for prosecuting ULP cases before the NLRB; indeed, the 
NLRB cannot adjudicate a ULP dispute until the General Counsel 
decides that a charge has merit and issues a formal complaint. In 
order to manage the caseload, the General Counsel has delegated 
the authority to investigate charges and issue complaints to 32 
regional directors. But the General Counsel retains final authority 
over charges and complaints and exercises general supervision of 
the regional directors.
Against this backdrop, the parties disagree over whether Solomon 
was serving as Acting General Counsel in violation of the FVRA 
when the Union lodged its ULP claim. In particular, they argue 
over whether the condition in § 3345(b)(1) (that a person served 
as first assistant to the office for at least 90 days during the prior 
year) applies only to vacancies filled under § 3345(a)(1) (so that 
Solomon’s continued service as Acting General Counsel, beyond 
January 2011, was valid, as the government would have it), or 
whether they also apply to vacancies filled under §§ 3345(a)(2) 
and (3) (so that Solomon’s service was invalid after President 
Obama nominated him for the permanent office in January 2011, as 
Southwest would have it).
The government argues that the text, structure, purposes, history, 
and application of the FVRA support its reading that the condition  
in § 3345(b)(1) applies only to first assistants who automatically  
fill a vacancy under § 3345(a)(1), and not to appointments under  
§§ 3345(a)(2) and (3). As to text, the government says that the 
plain language of § 3345(b)(1)—“[n]otwithstanding [Section 
3345(a)(1)]”—means that the condition in § 3345(b)(1) applies 
only to individuals appointed under § 3345(a)(1). As to structure, 
the government claims that its reading “sensibly reads a restriction 
tied to first-assistant status and length of service as first assistant to 
pertain only to officials who are themselves first assistants.” As  
to purposes and history, the government contends that its reading 
best serves the dual purposes of the Act and the intent of Congress 
by preventing the President from gaming appointments under  
§ 3345(a)(1) while at the same time giving the President flexibility 
to appoint under §§ 3345(a)(2) and (3). As to application, the 
government claims that its reading is supported by the Executive 
Branch’s long-standing interpretation and practice, with “Presidents 
of both parties making more than 100 nominations and designations 
premised on that understanding,” and with the acquiescence of 
Congress.
Southwest counters that the text, structure, and purpose support its 
reading that § 3345(b)(1) applies to all three ways that an acting 
officer may be appointed under the FVRA. As to text, Southwest 
points to the language of § 3345(b)(1), which says that “a person 
may not serve as an acting officer for an officer under this section” 
unless that person can satisfy the conditions. Southwest claims that 
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this applies to all persons serving under § 3345, including those 
serving under §§ 3345(a)(2) and (3). As to structure, Southwest 
contends that the introductory clause—“notwithstanding [Section 
3345(a)(1)]”—means only that § 3345(b)(1) applies without 
respect to the automatic, default provision of § 3345(a)(1), and 
not that it does not apply to §§ 3345(a)(2) and (3). As to purpose, 
Southwest claims that § 3345(b)(1)’s application to all acting 
officers is consistent with the purpose of the FVRA, to give the 
President flexibility in making temporary appointments, but also to 
restrict the President from choosing a permanent nominee to begin 
work under the guise of an acting appointment without Senate 
confirmation. 
Southwest argues next that the government’s arguments are 
wrong. Southwest says that “notwithstanding” in § 3345(b)(1) 
means “without respect to,” and not that § 3345(b)(1) applies only 
to § 3345(a)(1) appointments, and therefore that § 3345(b)(1) 
also applies to §§ 3345(a)(2) and (3). Southwest claims that this 
makes sense, because § 3345(b)(1) says that first assistants “may 
not serve as an acting officer” under certain circumstances; and 
only § 3345(a)(1) says that the first assistant “shall” serve (while 
in contrast §§ 3345(a)(2) and (3) appointments are permissive). 
Southwest contends that § 3345(b)(1) is most sensibly read to 
single out § 3345(a)(1), the only one of the three subsections that 
directly conflicts with § 3345(b)(1). Southwest claims that the 
government’s support for its FVRA history is weak, and contradicted 
by other history. And it contends that the Executive Branch’s 
consistent practice only means that the Executive Branch has 
improperly interpreted the Act, not that it has validly amended the 
Act.
SIGNIFICANCE
As the government points out, the Executive Branch has a long-
standing practice—dating back to the time nearly immediately 
after the FVRA’s passage—of appointing a PAS officer from another 
agency or a senior agency employee as an acting officer while also 
nominating that individual as the permanent officer. The D.C. 
Circuit’s approach would halt this practice and force a President to 
either choose someone else as the acting officer, choose someone 
else as the permanent nominee, or have the acting officer give 
up the duties of the office when that person is nominated. This 
approach would hamstring any President, but it could particularly 
restrict a new President in January 2017, who will likely staff 
agencies with acting officers until the President’s nominees can 
gain Senate confirmation. (Southwest disputes most of this. It 
claims that the government can only identify 14 acting officials 
“whose conduct even arguably is affected by the decision below.” It 
also claims that the D.C. Circuit’s approach would not restrict a new 
President, because the President would simply have to follow the 
D.C. Circuit’s rule.)
Moreover, this approach could call into question current senior 
officers’ decisions and past senior officers’ decisions going back 
three Presidents. Under the FVRA, these decisions would “have no 
force and effect” and “may not be ratified,” thus rendering them 
entirely null and void. (Southwest disputes this, too. It says that the 
D.C. Circuit said nothing about these provisions, and that they do 
not apply to the NLRB General Counsel, anyway.)
This case shares these characteristics—challenging a long-standing 
Executive Branch practice, and challenging current and prior 
officer decisions—with another relatively recent appointments 
challenge to the NLRB, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014). In Noel Canning, the Court ruled that President Obama 
exceeded his authority in appointing a member of the NLRB during 
a break, but not a recess, of the Senate. But Noel Canning involved a 
challenge to the President’s exercise of his power under the Recess 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. This case, in contrast, 
deals only with the FVRA, not the Recess Appointments Clause, the 
Appointments Clause, or any other provision in the Constitution. 
While this case may share some characteristics with Noel Canning, 
nothing about Noel Canning foreshadows an outcome here.
One final note: A split decision by the Supreme Court (4-4) would 
leave the D.C. Circuit ruling on the books, while saying nothing 
else about the state of the law. But this could still have a dramatic 
impact, given that most litigation over the actions of Executive 
Branch officials goes through the D.C. Circuit. (Only one other 
circuit court, the Ninth Circuit, has ruled on the question, and it 
agreed with the D.C. Circuit.)
Steven D. Schwinn is a professor of law at The John Marshall 
Law School and coeditor of the Constitutional Law Prof Blog. He 
specializes in constitutional law and human rights. He can be 
reached at sschwinn@jmls.edu or 312.386.2865.
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In October, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below we highlight some of the more engaging exchanges  
between the justices and the advocates during Shaw v. United States. This case asked the Court to consider whether  
a “scheme to defraud a financial institution,” as articulated in the Bank Fraud Statute, requires proof that the  
defendant intended to expose the bank to a financial loss or risk of loss.
Ms. Koren Bell (on behalf of the petitioner): Your Honor, the 
statute turns on intent, and were the government to prove the 
defendant’s intent to deprive of you of your possessory right, and 
that would be sufficient. And where that comes from is from this 
Court’s settled fraud precedent. Going back a hundred years, the 
Court has interpreted the term “defraud” to mean property lost to 
the victim. And we see that …
Justice Stephen Breyer: So if you’re insured and the—or at least 
the defendant believes he’s insured, it isn’t theft?
Ms. Bell: If the defendant believes that the bank is insured and 
therefore that another party will bear the loss?
Justice Breyer: Even Kardashian’s thief, if there is one, believes 
that all that jewelry is insured. Indeed over insured. So it’s not 
theft?
Ms. Bell: Well, so it would depend on the language of the statute.
Justice Breyer: No, it says defraud. She lied. He says I’m 
knocking on the door—you know, I’ll go as far as you want. 
But I don’t see that that has anything to do with it. You mean if 
he—if he defrauds him out of the money, he defrauds her out of 
the jewelry, says, here I am, your local jewelry cleaner. Gets the 
jewelry. Wouldn’t you think that was fraud? Even if she’s insured. 
Even if he thinks she’s triple insured. Even if he thinks that, in 
fact, this isn’t even her jewelry, that it was just loaned her on the 
occasion by a good friend, the necklace.
Ms. Bell: It would depend on whether the statute in that case 
required the intent to defraud …
Justice Breyer: What the statute says is defraud.
Ms. Bell: Defraud. In that case it’s much like the mail and wire 
fraud statutes which do not specify a required victim for the fraud 
scheme, and therefore provided the government could prove the 
two undisputed components of the term “defraud” which come 
from …
Justice Breyer: I’m not asking you to repeat it. I’m asking 
you, if the local person comes to the door and says, dear Miss 
Kardashian, I am your local jewelry cleaner. Please give me your 
jewelry. She does. And that’s not fraud. He wanted to get the 
jewelry. He tried to get the—he also believed that the friend had 
just loaned it for the evening, that she’s triple insured, that she 
won’t even lose any money because the publicity will be worth it. 
Okay?
Ms. Bell: Right. And that …
Justice Breyer: Now, my question is: There’s the statute. I would 
have always thought from first year of law school, criminal law, 
that that was fraud, but perhaps I was wrong. So I would like you 
to explain it.
Ms. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. That would be a scheme to defraud the 
insurer. 
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P AT E N T  L AW
When a Patent “Laches” on to Doctrine: Should There Be 
a Patent-Specifi c Approach to the Defense of Laches?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Supreme Court decided in 2014 that the doctrine of laches could not be invoked to shorten the three-
year statutory limit for obtaining legal relief in a copyright-infringement lawsuit. In a subsequent case, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that the Patent Act’s six-year statutory 
damages period presented different circumstances, and the Federal Circuit held en banc that laches could 
shorten the time for legal relief in a patent-infringement lawsuit. The Supreme Court will now decide 
whether this different result is warranted in patent law. 
SCA Hygiene Products v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC 
Docket No. 15-927
Argument Date: November 1, 2016
From: The Federal Circuit 
by Kelly Casey Mullally
Taylor English Duma LLP, Atlanta, GA
ISSUE
Whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar a claim 
for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act’s six-year 
statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286.
FACTS
Petitioners SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag and SCA Personal 
Care, Inc. (collectively SCA) sell adult incontinence products and 
own United States Patent No. 6,375,646 (the ’646 patent) directed 
to such products. The ’646 patent issued with 28 claims in 2002. 
Respondents First Quality Baby Products and three related entities 
(collectively First Quality) produce and sell a disposable version of 
an adult incontinence product that competes with SCA’s product and 
that SCA believes infringes the ’646 patent.
On October 31, 2003, SCA contacted First Quality, asserting 
infringement of the ’646 patent. In response, on November 21, 
2003, First Quality advised SCA that it believed SCA’s patent to be 
invalid in light of a patent that was fi led before SCA’s, U.S. Patent 
No. 5,415,649 (the ’649 patent). After First Quality’s response, SCA 
and First Quality did not communicate further about the alleged 
infringement. 
SCA later sought review from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Offi ce (PTO) as to the validity of its ’646 patent. On 
July 7, 2004, SCA fi led a request for reexamination of the ’646 
patent in light of the’649 patent. Reexamination, or “reexam,” is 
an administrative proceeding within the PTO whereby a requesting 
party, including the patentee, may seek review of an issued patent 
in light of one or more specifi c patents or printed publications cited 
in the reexamination request. If the PTO grants the request for 
reexamination and the patent survives reexamination, the PTO 
issues a certifi cate confi rming patentability. If the PTO determines 
that any claim of the patent is unpatentable over the cited reference 
or references, it issues a certifi cate cancelling any invalid claims. 
During reexam, a patentee may also amend the existing claims or 
add new claims to the patent, which the PTO will allow to issue if 
they are deemed patentable. 
In this case, the PTO granted SCA’s request for reexamination and, 
on March 27, 2007, confi rmed the patentability of all of the original 
claims. The PTO also issued several new claims that SCA had added 
during reexam. SCA did not notify First Quality of the reexamination 
request because reexam proceedings are available to the public and, 
in SCA’s view, First Quality therefore could monitor the proceedings 
itself. First Quality, however, believed that SCA had dropped its 
infringement allegations against First Quality after the November 
21st letter. Starting in 2006, First Quality made signifi cant 
investments in its adult-incontinence business, expanding its 
product line and acquiring other capital assets to do so. 
SCA was aware of First Quality’s activities but did not contact First 
Quality about the ’646 patent again until August 2, 2010, when 
SCA fi led the instant patent-infringement lawsuit against First 
Quality in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky. After discovery and an order construing the claims of 
the ’646 patent, First Quality fi led a motion for summary judgment. 
Among other things, First Quality sought to limit its liability based 
on the doctrine of laches, a judicially created, equitable doctrine 
that can restrict a right-holder who “sits on her hands” rather than 
acting in later asserting her rights against an adverse party. First 
Quality noted that service of the complaint had occurred over three 
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years after the reexam concluded and was the first time in nearly 
seven years that SCA had communicated with First Quality about the 
’646 patent. Laches can generally bar claims for certain equitable 
remedies, but First Quality also sought to use the doctrine to restrict 
SCA’s ability to recover legal relief, specifically back damages for the 
infringement, relying on precedent of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
SCA argued in response that the doctrine of laches did not apply 
to prevent legal relief for infringement that falls within the Patent 
Act’s six-year damages recovery period. To support its argument, 
SCA relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), which had recently 
held that the doctrine of laches could not bar legal relief within the 
Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations. The district court 
disagreed with SCA, however, holding that the doctrine of laches can 
apply to bar legal relief in patent suits and that SCA failed to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of 
its delay or First Quality’s presumed economic prejudice. The court 
granted summary judgment on the issue of laches in First Quality’s 
favor. 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the panel affirmed the district 
court’s judgment, holding that an unreasonable delay in suing for 
patent infringement can result in the loss of the right to seek legal 
relief. The court rejected SCA’s argument that the Petrella decision 
effectively abolished the doctrine of laches in patent law. SCA 
sought rehearing en banc, which the Federal Circuit granted “to 
resolve whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Petrella [,] … laches remains a defense to legal relief in a patent 
infringement suit.” 
In a close 6-5 split decision, the Court of Appeals adhered to the 
panel’s view. Chief Judge Prost wrote the majority opinion that 
relied heavily upon § 282(b)(1) of the Patent Act. That provision 
provides: “Defenses.—The following shall be defenses in any 
action involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be 
pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement 
or unenforceability.” En banc precedent of the Federal Circuit in 
A.C. Auckerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (en banc), had held that laches as a defense  
to legal relief was codified in that general language of 35 U.S.C.  
§ 282, based on the well-established existence of the defense at the 
time the patent laws were recodified in 1952, the legislative history, 
and commentary from one of the principal drafters of the legislation. 
The SCA court conducted its own analysis and review of the 
precedents and other authorities and reaffirmed the A.C. Auckerman 
court’s interpretation of § 282(b)(1). Chief Judge Prost then 
explained that the court had no authority to question the statute’s 
propriety. She concluded, “If … Congress decides that the § 286 
damages limitation and the § 282 laches defense are incompatible, 
it can change the law. As a court, however, we must apply the law as 
enacted, which means that the § 286 damages limitation and the  
§ 282 laches defense must continue to coexist.” 
As a final point in reaching its conclusion, the majority reasoned 
that differences between copyright law and patent law also justified 
the outcome. Specifically, the court noted that defendants accused of 
copyright infringement had a greater ability to insulate themselves 
from damages through evidence of independent creation, whereas 
independent invention is no defense to patent infringement. 
Thus, the court found persuasive the arguments of many industry 
groups that retaining laches in patent law was necessary to provide 
a safeguard against stale claims brought long after companies 
have lost the ability to choose an alternative technology to avoid 
infringement.
The court determined that the Petrella decision did not alter the 
foregoing outcome: “Whether Congress considered the quandary in 
Petrella is irrelevant—in the 1952 Patent Act, Congress settled that 
laches and a time limitation on the recovery of damages can coexist 
in patent law.” The court held that Petrella and other Supreme Court 
precedent did, however, require modification of the laches defense. 
In particular, the Court’s precedent made clear the importance of 
maintaining the distinction between equitable estoppel, which can 
bar a patentee’s claim completely and is tantamount to a patentee 
granting a license to an accused infringer based on misleading 
actions by a patentee and resultant loss to an accused infringer, and 
laches. The Federal Circuit majority accordingly held that laches can 
“only foreclose an ongoing royalty in extraordinary circumstances.” 
Otherwise, if laches bars legal relief, as the court held it can, 
and all equitable relief, the outcome would be the same as that 
reached through equitable estoppel, a result against which Petrella 
cautioned.
The five judges concurring in part and dissenting in part agreed, 
in an opinion written by Judge Hughes, that laches continues to 
be a defense to equitable relief such as an injunction or ongoing 
royalties, when warranted by the circumstances. They disagreed, 
however, with the majority’s holding that Congress had codified the 
defense of laches as to legal relief in § 282. Instead, they reasoned 
that, to the extent that § 282 codified the common law, that common 
law derived from Supreme Court precedent relating to the doctrine 
of laches generally, not the common law of laches in the limited 
context of patent law. That Supreme Court precedent held that 
laches was only a defense to equitable actions and therefore, the 
five judges in the minority concluded, laches could not serve to 
bar legal relief in patent-infringement actions. They rejected a 
patent-specific approach to laches, emphasizing that “[p]atent 
law is governed by the same common-law principles, methods of 
statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil 
litigation.” 
CASE ANALYSIS
In 35 U.S.C. § 286, entitled “Time limitation on damages,” the 
Patent Act limits the recovery of damages for patent infringement 
to the six years preceding the filing of the claim of infringement, 
stating: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be 
had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to 
the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the 
action.” The Court will now decide whether laches is a defense to 
patent infringement occurring within the six-year recovery period 
of § 286. 
In addressing that issue, Petrella looms large, as the lower courts’ 
decisions and the parties’ positions focused on that precedent, and 
the Court will certainly take into account its reasoning and holding 
in Petrella. That case involved a dispute regarding rights to Martin 
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Scorsese’s 1980 film Raging Bull, owned by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
(MGM). The plaintiff, Petrella, alleged that the film infringed a 
1963 screenplay written by her late father. Petrella renewed the 
copyright to the screenplay in 1991, but did not contact MGM about 
her infringement contentions until seven years later. Then, over the 
course of two years, Petrella and MGM exchanged letters about the 
alleged copyright infringement. MGM subsequently heard nothing 
further from Petrella until she filed suit in 2009, about nine years 
after her last contact with MGM. In response, MGM moved for 
summary judgment on the theory of laches. 
The Supreme Court, however, held that laches could not be used 
as a defense to legal relief for copyright infringement. In reaching 
its result, the Court relied on § 507 of the Copyright Act, entitled, 
“Limitations on Actions,” and which provides in part that “[n]o civil 
action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless 
it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” That 
statute of limitations, the Court reasoned, “itself takes account 
of delay.” In contrast, the Court explained, “laches is a defense 
developed by courts of equity; its principal application was, and 
remains, to claims of an equitable case for which the Legislature 
has provided no fixed time limitation.” Laches “originally served as 
a guide when no statute of limitations controlled the claim.” Noting 
separation-of-powers concerns, the Petrella Court emphasized that 
laches is a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding” doctrine. “To 
the extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct 
occurring within the limitations period … courts are not at liberty 
to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.” The Court 
accordingly held, “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by 
Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.” The Petrella 
Court noted that laches can nevertheless impact the equitable relief 
available to a right-holder, explaining, “the consequences of a delay 
in commencing suit may be of such sufficient magnitude to warrant 
… curtailment of the relief equitably awarded” during the remedial 
stage of a case or even at the outset of the litigation, and depending 
on the circumstances.
The Petrella opinion also touched on the related areas of trademark 
and patent law. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that 
Congress could provide for a laches defense in copyright law, noting 
that it had done so in the Lanham Act for trademark-infringement 
actions. Regarding patent suits, the Court expressly took no position 
on whether its decision would extend to that area of law, stating that 
“based in part on § 282 and commentary thereon, legislative history, 
and historical practice, the Federal Circuit has held that laches can 
bar damages incurred prior to the commencement of suit. … We 
have not had occasion to review the Federal Circuit’s position.” 
In SCA Hygiene, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that position, 
concluding that the different circumstances in the patent context 
compelled a different result from that in Petrella. 
SCA argues that the Federal Circuit erred in doing so. In SCA’s view, 
§ 286 is a statute of limitations, just as in Petrella. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Petrella forecloses the use of laches 
to abridge § 286. SCA also argues that the Federal Circuit’s unique 
approach to laches in patent law conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
“equity jurisprudence,” which mandates a flexible approach to 
laches, rather than the inflexible scheme SCA contends that the 
Federal Circuit applies in presuming the reliance and prejudice 
aspects of the laches defense as to all infringement occurring within 
the six-year time period when the first act of infringement occurs 
more than six years before suit.
SCA further argues that, to be consistent with the purpose of § 286, 
§ 282 cannot be interpreted as incorporating a defense of laches 
that bars legal relief that is otherwise allowed by § 286. Turning 
to the legislative history, SCA argues that nothing in the statutes 
preceding the 1952 Patent Act when § 282 was codified suggests that 
Congress intended laches to bar legal damages arising within the 
statutory limitations period. Instead, SCA argues, § 286 sets forth 
Congress’s judgment as to the timeliness of a claim for damages, 
and laches should not be available to further limit those damages. 
SCA counsels that the Court should follow the separation-of-powers 
principles at issue in Petrella and respect Congress’s choice to use  
§ 286 to address the timeliness of patent infringement suit.
Invoking policies of clarity, predictability, notice, and sound dispute 
resolution, SCA further urges reversal of the Federal Circuit 
decision. Among other things, SCA argues that laches promotes 
needless, expensive litigation rather than settlement because clear 
rules as to timeliness aid patentees in assessing when the benefits 
of suing will outweigh the costs. SCA explains that an ambiguous 
limitations standard created by the inherent uncertainty of laches 
would incentivize patent holders to quickly file lawsuits to avoid 
losing their rights, thus increasing patent litigation that could 
otherwise be avoided if patentees are given time to assess possible 
infringement.
First Quality argues that Congress intended to incorporate laches 
as a defense to legal damages in § 282. First Quality cites decisions 
from before the passages of the 1952 Patent Act to argue that 
federal courts uniformly recognized that laches could bar recovery 
of legal relief for patent infringement, in both actions brought at 
law and equity, and that Congress incorporated this common law 
into 35 U.S.C. § 282. First Quality notes that the Federal Circuit, and 
other circuit courts before the creation of the Federal Circuit, have 
continued to apply laches in this fashion and that Congress has not 
altered that practice, despite repeated opportunities to do so. First 
Quality agrees that the separation-of-powers concerns expressed in 
Petrella apply to this case, but essentially argues that those concerns 
counsel in favor of not ignoring Congress’s codification of laches as 
a defense to legal relief in § 282.
First Quality further urges that permitting laches as a defense to 
legal relief is not unique to patent law, citing an example from 
employment law and a case arising under the Multiemployer 
Pension Plan Amendments Act. At the same time, patent law does 
present differences from copyright law that, First Quality argues, 
justify a different outcome in the patent context. In particular, First 
Quality argues that § 286 is not a statute of limitations, unlike  
§ 507(b) of the Copyright Act at issue in Petrella. In addition, First 
Quality notes that the Petrella Court’s reasoning that Congress must 
have been aware that some copyright infringement actions would 
be brought after long periods of delay did not apply in patent law, 
because the term of patent protection is considerably shorter than 
the term of copyright protection. 
First Quality also asserts SCA’s position would unfairly allow a 
patentee to sit silently on its rights while an innocent infringer 
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expends substantial time and other resources to develop and 
commercialize a product independently, only to have a patentee 
thwart its efforts with a tardy claim at the peak of the competitor’s 
profitability. This is particularly problematic because, First Quality 
argues, patent law is subject to concerns not found in copyright 
law, such as “lock-in” issues, whereby a business might explore 
several possible technologies but ultimately become “locked in” to 
one, making significant investments, whereby substitution of an 
alternative, noninfringing technology ex post is no longer feasible. 
Commercial and nonprofit amici from a variety of fields filed 
briefs in the case. For example, nonprofit organizations Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge in support of affirmance, 
emphasizing that delay is particularly pernicious in patent law due 
to the acute susceptibility to loss of invalidity evidence over time. 
On the other side, a brief filed on behalf of law professors who teach 
and write in the areas of remedies and patent law supports SCA 
and argues that laches is an equitable doctrine that should not bar 
claims for legal relief.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents the Supreme Court with the “occasion to review 
the Federal Circuit’s position” regarding laches that the Court noted 
in Petrella that it had not yet had. It also gives the Court another 
opportunity to continue its abatement of patent-law exceptionalism, 
as the Court must determine if it should depart from its reasoning 
in Petrella based on the different circumstances in the patent 
context cited by the Federal Circuit majority. Relatedly, the Court 
must decide whether the common law codified in § 282 of the Patent 
Act was specific to the application of laches in patent law, or whether 
it related to the doctrine of laches, which applies throughout the 
law, more generally. A steady stream of Supreme Court decisions in 
patent cases for more than a decade have course-corrected patent 
law to be more aligned with universally applicable legal principles. 
If the Court departs from that trend and instead determines that 
laches does apply in a unique way in the patent context to also bar 
legal relief, this will limit accused infringers’ exposure to retroactive 
damages. Patent-infringement defendants will be able to rely on 
laches as a defense to legal relief when a patentee unreasonably 
delays in bringing an infringement claim. A contrary ruling will 
benefit patentees, because laches could only be used to limit patent 
holders’ equitable relief. Patentees would not be prevented by 
laches from waiting to bring suit until a strategically advantageous 
time, such as shortly after a competitor’s most profitable six 
years of revenues, or at a time more economically feasible for a 
patentee to invest in expensive litigation. Patent owners often have 
compelling reasons for waiting to bring suit. For example, a patent 
may be subjected, at the election of the patentee or by request of 
a third party, to a variety of post-issuance proceedings, such as 
the reexamination procedure that occurred with the ’646 patent 
here, or the newer inter partes review process being utilized in an 
increasing number of patent cases following passage of the America 
Invents Act. 
The number of cases that will be affected by the Court’s decision, 
regardless of the substantive outcome, is not insignificant. The 
term of patent protection begins at issuance and runs for twenty 
years from the earliest effective filing date of the patent application. 
A typical term for a mechanical invention, for example, is about 
seventeen years. Because patent infringement is an ongoing 
offense, with each copy of an infringing product constituting a 
new act of infringement, the six-year statutory limit can restart 
continually throughout the life of a patent if an infringer continues 
to practice the patented technology. Patentees will accordingly often 
seek damages going back six years. Thus, if an infringer has been 
making a patented product for fifteen years, a patentee will rely on 
§ 286 to reach back to the six years prior to filing the complaint for 
damages. This six-year damages period in patent law is generous 
compared to the time limits applicable to many other types of civil 
lawsuits. These lengthy periods of time also increase the potential 
for periods of delay on the part of patentees in asserting their rights, 
and this case will determine whether accused infringers can use 
those time lapses, when they are unreasonable, to bar a patentee’s 
collection of back damages that would otherwise be recoverable 
under § 286.
Kelly Mullally specializes in appellate litigation and intellectual 
property law with the firm of Taylor English Duma LLP in Atlanta, 
Georgia. She is a registered patent attorney and served as a law 
clerk to the Honorable William C. Bryson, U.S. Court of Appeals  
for the Federal Circuit, and the Honorable J.L. Edmondson, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. She can be reached at 
kmullally@taylorenglish.com.
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In October, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below we highlight some of the more engaging exchanges between the  
justices and the advocates during Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado. This case asked the Court to determine whether a rule that a court may  
not consider evidence of the content of jury deliberations could bar evidence of a juror’s racial bias against the criminal defendant.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor: I always thought the most pernicious 
and odious discrimination in our law is based on race.
Mr. Jeffrey L. Fisher (on behalf of petitioner): I agree with that.
Justice Sotomayor: All right. So why is a rule that says, given 
the exceptions we’ve recognized since the 1800s that have said 
that race is the most pernicious thing in our justice system, why 
can’t we limit this just to race using principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well?
Mr. Fisher: I’m not denying that you can. And of course, the 
Constitution needs to be read structurally. So not only …
Chief Justice John Roberts: You think it’s odious to have the 
same sort of discrimination against someone because he’s a 
Muslim or practices Islamic faith? You’re saying, he’s a Muslim. 
Of course, you know, given this, I know how Muslims behave; 
he committed this crime. Is that not sufficiently like racial 
discrimination that it should be carved out?
Mr. Fisher: It may well be, Your Honor. It certainly is odious.
Chief Justice Roberts: What about sexual orientation? Somebody 
gives, you know, a bigoted speech in the jury room about sexual 
orientation and how particular types of people are more likely 
to commit crimes like the one before them? Is that sufficiently 
odious?
Mr. Fisher: It’s quite odious. But whether it would satisfy the 
balancing test we’re setting forth today would be needed to 
decide …
Justice Stephen Breyer: You have to have an answer for this 
reason. No one on the other side thinks anything but this is 
terrible jury misbehavior. That’s a given across the case. It is not a 
question of the validity of the behavior. It’s invalid. The question is 
the timing of when somebody has to object. 
 *  *  *  *
Mr. Frederick Yager (on behalf of respondents): I think it would 
be difficult in the context of the Sixth Amendment in the same 
courthouse in Colorado to tell one defendant that that defendant 
gets to impeach the verdict because the error that happened to 
occur during deliberations is racial, whereas across the hall it 
was religious, or it was simply the jurors disrespecting the jury 
system enough to flip a coin. And—and that’s the problem. In all 
of these cases in which Rule 606(b) is going to apply, you’re going 
to be putting the individual defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, 
which Petitioner acknowledges can be implicated in a wide range 
of cases, versus the interests that, Justice Kagan, I think you 
acknowledge are weighty and important, and precisely why Rule 
606(b) has survived for so many years.
Justice Anthony Kennedy: Suppose this were a capital case. 
Would the government of the United States come and make this 
argument, that the person can be executed despite what we know 
happened in the jury room?
Mr. Yarger: Well, Your Honor, I think … certainly, this isn’t a capital 
case, and that might raise different issues. There are cases set in 
the briefing that are capital cases in which the …
continued on page 69
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F O R E I G N  S O V E R E I G N  I M M U N I T Y
What Is the Pleading Standard for Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns 
Based on Takings in Violation of International Law?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
Respondents are a U.S. company and its Venezuelan subsidiary in the oil-drilling business. After Venezuela 
expropriated the subsidiary’s oil rigs, respondents sued Venezuela and two state-owned companies, 
basing jurisdiction of the U.S. court on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s “expropriation” exception. 
The Court will decide whether a plaintiff must merely overcome the “exceptionally low bar” of a “non-
frivolous” pleading, or whether a plaintiff must plead more in order to show that “rights in property taken 
in violation of international law are in issue.”
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.
Docket No. 15-423
Argument Date: November 2, 2016
From: The D.C. Circuit
by Birgit Kurtz
Gibbons P.C., New York, NY
INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) provides 
that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in 
sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Under the 
FSIA’s “expropriation” exception, in pertinent part, “[a] foreign 
state shall not be immune … in any case … in which rights in 
property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
ISSUE
Is the pleading standard for alleging that a case falls within the 
FSIA’s expropriation exception more demanding than the standard 
for pleading jurisdiction under the federal-question statute, which 
allows a jurisdictional dismissal only if the federal claim is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous?
FACTS
Petitioners are the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela) 
and two state-owned companies (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. and 
PDVSA Petróleo, S.A., together PDVSA).
Respondents are Helmerich & Payne International Drilling 
Company (H&P-IDC), an Oklahoma-based company, and Helmerich 
& Payne de Venezuela, C.A. (H&P-V), a company incorporated under 
Venezuelan law and a wholly owned subsidiary of H&P-IDC.
In the 1970s, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry, and Venezuela 
now controls the production and exportation of oil through 
PDVSA. Respondents allege that, for several decades, H&P-IDC 
provided oil-drilling services to petitioners through H&P-V and its 
predecessors. In 2007, H&P-V entered into certain contracts with 
PDVSA for drilling services over a period of time using specialized 
drilling rigs, which H&P-IDC purchased and then transferred to 
H&P-V. Respondents allege that, by 2009, Venezuela and PDVSA had 
failed to pay approximately $100 million owed to H&P-V under the 
contracts. They allege that, in response, H&P-V fulfi lled its existing 
contractual obligations and announced that it would not renew the 
contracts until it was paid; it also disassembled its drilling rigs.
Respondents allege that, in June 2010, petitioners blocked H&P-V’s 
properties where the disassembled rigs were maintained. 
Shortly thereafter, upon the recommendation of the Venezuelan 
National Assembly, then-President Hugo Chavez issued a decree 
expropriating H&P-V’s property. Respondents allege that petitioners 
now use H&P-V’s rigs and other assets in their state-owned drilling 
business.
In 2011, respondents commenced a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia, alleging that (1) PDVSA and Venezuela 
took their property in violation of international law and (2) PDVSA 
breached the contracts with H&P-V. Regarding the fi rst count, 
respondents assert that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(3)—the “expropriation” exception.
Petitioners moved to dismiss respondents’ expropriation claims, 
arguing that they did not fall within the scope of the expropriation 
exception to immunity. The district court granted the motion to 
dismiss in part and denied it in part. The court dismissed H&P-V’s 
expropriation claim because it determined that H&P-V is a national 
of Venezuela, holding that “generally, a foreign sovereign’s 
expropriation of its own national’s property does not violate 
international law.” The court did not, however, dismiss H&P-IDC’s 
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expropriation claim, reasoning that, although H&P-IDC did not 
own the property petitioners allegedly seized from H&P-V, H&P-IDC 
asserted that petitioners effectively took its interest in H&P-V as a 
going concern.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s expropriation-related rulings in part and reversed in part; 
Judge Sentelle dissented in part.
The Court of Appeals held that the pleading standard concerning the 
expropriation exception provides an “exceptionally low bar.” The 
court relied on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (and D.C. Circuit 
precedent relying on Bell), and held that subject-matter jurisdiction 
“is not defeated” by the possibility that a complaint “might fail to 
state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.” 
The court concluded instead that it would dismiss a complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA “on the grounds that the plaintiff 
has failed to plead a ‘taking in violation of international law’ or has 
no ‘rights in property … in issue’ only if the claims are ‘wholly 
insubstantial or frivolous.’” (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals held that H&P-V had “asserted a nonfrivolous 
international expropriation claim.” The court acknowledged 
that, under the so-called domestic-takings rule, a foreign state’s 
expropriation of its own national’s property does not violate 
international law. But the court held that international law prohibits 
a state from expropriating the property of a domestic corporation 
based on discrimination against the corporation’s foreign 
shareholders. In the absence of “any decision from any circuit that 
so completely forecloses H&P-V’s discriminatory takings theory as 
to inescapably render the claim[] frivolous and completely devoid 
of merit,” the court held that H&P-V’s claim “has satisfied this 
Circuit’s forgiving standard.”
The Court of Appeals also held that H&P-IDC’s claim that its own 
“rights in property” had been taken in violation of international 
law was not frivolous. The court explained that a “shareholder may 
have rights in corporate property” not derivative of the corporation’s 
rights, and that H&P-IDC alleged that it had suffered “a total loss of 
control over its subsidiary.” Thus, without resolving the question of 
whether H&P-IDC had properly alleged “rights in property” under 
§ 1605(a)(3), the court held that “H&P-IDC has ‘put its rights in 
property in issue in a non-frivolous way.’”
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sentelle stated that he would have 
held both H&P-V and H&P-IDC had “failed to plead a taking in 
violation of international law.”
CASE ANALYSIS
Foreign sovereigns have been generally immune from suit in U.S. 
courts for more than two centuries. As early as 1812, U.S. courts 
generally declined to assert jurisdiction over cases involving foreign 
government defendants, a practice based in a sense of “grace 
and comity” between the United States and other nations. Judges 
instead deferred to the views of the Executive Branch as to whether 
such cases should proceed in U.S. courts, exercising jurisdiction 
only where the U.S. State Department expressly referred claims for 
their consideration.
In 1952, U.S. courts’ jurisdiction over claims against foreign 
states and their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State 
Department issued the so-called Tate Letter, which announced 
the Department’s adoption of a new “restrictive theory” of foreign 
sovereign immunity to guide courts in invoking jurisdiction over 
foreign sovereigns. The Tate Letter directed that state sovereigns 
continue to be entitled to immunity from suits involving their 
sovereign, or “public,” acts. But acts taken in a commercial or 
“private” capacity would no longer be protected from U.S. court 
review. But even with this new guidance, courts continued to seek 
the Executive Branch’s views on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether to assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns—a system 
that risked inconsistency and susceptibility to “diplomatic pressures 
rather than to the rule of law.”
In 1976, Congress addressed this problem by enacting the FSIA, 
essentially codifying the “restrictive theory” of immunity and 
empowering the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity 
without resort to the Executive Branch. Today, the FSIA provides the 
“sole basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. 
courts. The FSIA provides that “foreign states”—including their 
“political subdivisions” and “agencies or instrumentalities”—shall 
be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of the 
exceptions to immunity set forth in the statute applies. The FSIA 
includes several provisions that define the scope of a foreign state’s 
immunity and establishes detailed procedural requirements for 
bringing claims against a sovereign defendant.
The exceptions to immunity are set forth in §§ 1605 and 1605A of 
the FSIA. These exceptions include, inter alia, certain claims based 
on commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tortious 
or terrorist acts by foreign sovereign entities. In most instances, 
where a claim falls under one of the FSIA exceptions, the FSIA 
provides that the foreign state shall be subject to jurisdiction in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual. 
The FSIA also includes separate provisions establishing immunity 
(and exceptions to immunity) from the attachment, in aid of 
execution of a judgment against a foreign state or its agencies or 
instrumentalities, of property located in the United States. Finally, 
the FSIA sets forth various unique procedural rules for claims 
against foreign states, including, e.g., special rules for service of 
process, default judgments, and appeals.
Once a court decides that an entity must be viewed as a foreign 
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state and possibly 
entitled to immunity, it must then decide if one of the exceptions  
set forth in the FSIA applies. The expropriation exception (also 
known as the takings exception) of the FSIA is set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(3) and provides as follows:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States or of the States in any 
case … in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is present in the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or 
that property or any property exchanged for such property 
is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of 
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the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is 
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States; …
Petitioners argue that the FSIA exceptions must be applied narrowly 
and that therefore the pleading standard must be higher than the 
“non-frivolousness” standard set forth in Bell v. Hood.
Petitioners argue that the FSIA creates an express statutory 
presumption of foreign sovereign immunity and that this 
presumption can be overcome only if the substantive requirements 
for revoking immunity set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607 are met. 
Because the FSIA carefully “carves out” these exceptions to the 
general grant of immunity, courts must be careful to ensure that the 
requirements are met, as an overly expansive standard may upset 
the careful balance Congress struck.
Petitioners contend that, when evaluating the legal sufficiency 
of the pleadings under the FSIA’s exceptions, the Court has 
consistently applied a single standard: A plaintiff must plead facts 
which, if true, establish the existence of all the elements set out 
in the relevant statutory exception. Petitioners argue that the 
expropriation exception is no different. While they concede that the 
requirements of the expropriation exception might overlap with the 
elements of the underlying claim for relief, they argue that that is 
no reason to depart from the usual analysis. Petitioners point out 
that, in other cases involving the FSIA’s exceptions, the Court did 
not hesitate to decide jurisdictional questions that happen to overlap 
with issues affecting the merits. Petitioners contend that the text, 
history, and purpose of the FSIA, as well as the Court’s precedents, 
demand that the same standard apply to the expropriation exception 
that applies to other exceptions. Under that standard, a court 
evaluating the legal sufficiency of the jurisdictional pleadings should 
decide whether the rights claimed to be “in issue” in the complaint 
are in fact “rights in property taken in violation of international 
law.”
Petitioners disagree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that a 
complaint survives jurisdictional dismissal so long as its allegations 
that “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in 
issue” are not “wholly insubstantial or frivolous.” Petitioners argue 
that the Court in Bell v. Hood interpreted only 28 U.S.C. § 1331  
and did not create a general rule applicable to all jurisdictional 
statutes. Petitioners argue that there are a number of reasons why 
the federal-question pleading standard should not be applied to the 
FSIA’s expropriation exception. First, the text of the federal question 
statute is not comparable to the text of the expropriation exception. 
Section 1331 imposes no substantive prerequisites to jurisdiction; 
it broadly confers jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The 
expropriation exception, on the other hand, is one of the FSIA’s 
substantive prerequisites, and it is much more specific.
Petitioners reason that the histories, policies, and purposes of 
the two statutes are also different. The federal-question statute is 
intended to determine whether a case is properly brought in federal 
court, or whether it instead should be litigated in state court. The 
FSIA, by contrast, regulates whether a foreign state may be sued in 
any court in the United States.
Respondents contend that the Bell v. Hood pleading standard should 
be applied to the FSIA’s expropriation exception and that only 
frivolous and wholly insubstantial claims must be dismissed at the 
jurisdictional stage.
Respondents point out that the Court has time and time again 
held that “jurisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that the 
averments in a complaint might fail to state a cause of action on 
which the plaintiff could actually recover.” They argue that the “non-
frivolousness” rule was not specially “created” in Bell for use only in 
cases under § 1331, but rather that the Court has followed that rule 
in evaluating jurisdiction under a wide range of statutes, regardless 
of variations in their text or policies.
Respondents argue that the expropriation exception requires that 
the plaintiff put “in issue” a claim that rights in property have been 
taken in violation of international law; the FSIA’s use of the phrase 
“in issue” simply asks what assertions are “in dispute” or “under 
discussion.” The low pleading standard is compelled by the FSIA’s 
history, which confirms that Congress enacted the expropriation 
exception to provide a U.S. forum to decide the merits of claims 
seeking a remedy for the unlawful taking of property by a foreign 
state. Respondents claim that nothing in the FSIA displaces the 
long-standing, widespread practice that the possibility a claim might 
fail on its merits does not defeat the court’s jurisdiction to decide 
the merits, at least where the claim is not “clearly immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or “wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous.”
Respondents assert that petitioners are conflating the merits 
question with the standard defining the court’s jurisdiction to 
decide. Respondents insist that it makes no sense to require courts 
to decide the merits question in order to determine their authority 
to decide it—such a requirement would, in effect, front-end the 
merits analysis.
The United States, as amicus in support of petitioners, asserts that 
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that nonfrivolous allegations 
regarding the substantive requirements of an immunity exception 
were sufficient to establish jurisdiction—a standard that the court 
itself described as “exceptionally low.” The United States argues, 
instead, that § 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA creates a narrow exception 
to foreign sovereign immunity in certain cases “in which rights in 
property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” Like 
the FSIA’s other exceptions to immunity, the expropriation exception 
“codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an 
aspect of substantive federal law,” and “whether statutory subject-
matter jurisdiction exists under the FSIA entails an application of 
the substantive terms of the Act to determine whether one of the 
specified exceptions to immunity applies.”
The United States reasons that the FSIA calls for courts to decide a 
foreign state’s “entitlement” to immunity, not to theorize about what 
the outcome of that analysis could conceivably be. Section 1605(a)
(3) requires that “rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue” —not that such rights may be in 
issue, or that there may have been a taking that international law 
might proscribe. The United States asserts that requiring a legal 
determination of immunity at the “threshold” of the action is 
necessary in order to ensure that the foreign state actually receives 
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the protections of immunity if no exception applies, to preserve 
the dignity of the foreign state and comity between nations, and 
to safeguard the interests of the United States when it is sued in 
foreign courts.
The two former State Department attorneys (John Norton Moore 
and Edwin D. Williamson), as amicus supporting respondents, 
argue that the FSIA was designed to confer jurisdiction in some 
cases and preclude it in others; it was not intended to create a 
“presumption” of sovereign immunity that must be overcome 
before a court may exercise jurisdiction over the merits of any claim 
against a foreign state. The main purpose of the FSIA is to remove 
discretionary and policy-driven considerations from the sovereign 
immunity determination and replace them with concrete statutory 
rules for application by the courts. The former State Department 
attorneys argue that courts should not add additional requirements 
where the FSIA creates none; there is no indication in the FSIA’s 
text, structure, or legislative history that the expressly enumerated 
exceptions were meant to be limited by additional judicially 
implied presumptions. The attorneys argue that the principles of 
“international comity” and the dignity of foreign sovereigns are 
not relevant to the Court’s task to identify the appropriate pleading 
standard applicable to claims brought under the expropriation 
exception.
The former State Department attorneys explain that the 
expropriation exception was the product of a joint effort of the 
Executive Branch and Congress to respond to the widespread 
expropriation by foreign sovereigns of U.S.-owned assets, especially 
in communist countries such as Cuba after Fidel Castro’s ascent 
to power. The year before the FSIA was drafted, the White House 
had announced a series of retaliatory measures against foreign 
sovereigns that expropriated property owned by American citizens. 
Congress included the expropriation exception in the FSIA to 
expand on these measures by giving expropriation victims a 
remedy against foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. The former State 
Department attorneys argue that a heightened standard for pleading 
jurisdiction over expropriation claims would depart from the text, 
structure, and history of the exception and frustrate its purpose.
SIGNIFICANCE
At first glance, the case presents a disagreement on a seemingly 
base procedural requirement—the pleading standard for certain 
complaints. But that pleading standard could potentially have a 
significant impact on U.S. diplomatic relations with numerous 
foreign countries.
If the Court decides that the proper pleading standard for the FSIA’s 
expropriation exception is the “exceptionally low bar” promulgated 
in Bell v. Hood, then foreign nations thus haled into a U.S. court 
could view the proceeding as an affront to their sovereign dignity, 
and the United States’ relations with that country may well suffer 
damage. This may result in reduced cooperation in various areas, 
including diplomatic and economic relations. In addition, because 
some countries require reciprocity in order to grant foreign 
countries sovereign immunity from proceedings in their own courts, 
the United States may well be denied sovereign immunity from suit 
in foreign countries’ courts.
If, on the other hand, the Court adopts a heightened pleading 
standard, then, in theory, rogue foreign countries might feel 
emboldened to expropriate property owned by U.S. citizens or 
companies, believing that they can act with impunity. In contrast, 
a lower pleading standard might theoretically prevent takings due 
to the threat of a U.S. court proceeding. Realistically, however, 
the foreign governments that tend to take property in violation of 
international law will most likely not be influenced—one way or the 
other—by an esoteric procedural rule applicable in U.S. courts.
Birgit Kurtz is a director in the New York office of Gibbons P.C., 
focusing on international commercial dispute resolution and art  
law. She can be reached at BKurtz@gibbonslaw.com or 
212.613.2009.
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F E D E R A L  J U R I S D I C T I O N
Does a Sue-and-Be-Sued Provision in Fannie Mae’s 
Charter Confer Federal Jurisdiction?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was created in 1938 through the Federal Housing 
Act to assist in making mortgages, and thereby lenders, more liquid. By 1974, it was a private corporation 
and the government owed none of its stock. Petitioners brought state law claims against Cendant 
Mortgage Corporation and Fannie Mae in connection with their mortgage foreclosures. They brought the 
case in state court after the federal court in the Central District of California dismissed it. Fannie Mae 
removed the case to federal court, which then dismissed the case on res judicata and collateral estoppel 
grounds because the claims had been dealt with in prior litigation. This is one of four federal lawsuits fi led 
by the petitioners, each of which was dismissed either on the merits or on res judicata grounds. The Ninth 
Circuit affi rmed the dismissal but later sua sponte withdrew its disposition and appointed counsel for the 
pro se petitioners. It directed briefi ng on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 
then said that the sue-and-be-sued clause, which says the agency can sue and be sued in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, state or federal, conferred federal jurisdiction. It denied en banc review.
Lightfoot et al. v. Cendant Mortgage Corp. et al.
Docket No. 14-1055
Argument Date: November 8, 2016
From: The Ninth Circuit
by Barbara L. Jones
Minnesota Lawyer, Minneapolis, MN
ISSUES
Does Fannie Mae’s charter confer federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction?
Is American National Red Cross v. S.G. controlling or should it 
be overruled?
FACTS
At this stage, this case has nothing to do with the mortgage 
foreclosure. Cendant is not even involved in the appeal. Neither the 
parties’ briefs nor the Ninth Circuit opinion discuss the petitioners’ 
underlying claims. In its response to the certiorari petition, Fannie 
Mae stated that the petitioners fi led at least fi ve lawsuits trying to 
stop the foreclosure, for the most part based on allegations that they 
were fraudulently induced to acquire a mortgage for which they 
were not qualifi ed.
The Supreme Court is asked only to decide whether the case 
belongs in federal court. The statute at issue, 12 U.S.C. § 1723(a), 
is the charter that created Fannie Mae and said that it could sue 
and be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction, state or federal. 
The present language refl ects a 1954 amendment that replaced the 
original phrase “court of law or equity” with the phrase “court of 
competent jurisdiction.” So the ultimate question is what the words 
“court of competent jurisdiction” mean.
The Ninth Circuit said that a specifi c reference to the federal 
courts, as found in § 1723(a), is necessary and suffi cient to confer 
jurisdiction. It believed that the 1992 case of American National 
Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, adopted this clear rule. It said of its 
ruling in Lightfoot, “we do not write on a clean slate.”
CASE ANALYSIS
Each of the parties has the benefi t of some broad doctrines. The 
petitioners have the policies that the federal courts have limited 
jurisdiction and that statutes mean what their plan language says. 
The respondents have case law history for both its precedential 
value and because Congress legislates against a backdrop of prior 
decisions.
“Let us begin with plain English,” the petitioners say. To them, the 
phrase “competent jurisdiction” clearly and plainly signifi es a court 
with an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. In a long list 
of standard corporate powers, the sue-and-be sued clause grants 
capacity, not jurisdiction, they assert. In contrast, they continue, 
the Ninth Circuit says that a court of competent jurisdiction means 
any federal court if there is a specifi c reference in the law to federal 
courts.
But the Ninth Circuit certainly didn’t mean to say that any state 
court would be a court of competent jurisdiction, petitioners 
continue, because clearly a state court would have to have other 
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subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioners claim even Fannie Mae 
agrees with that assertion. Additionally, other statutes have sue-
and-be-sued provisions along with express federal jurisdictional 
provisions, illustrating that the jurisdictional grant is necessary. The 
lower court should have ruled under Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 
(1977), and other cases, that an independent basis for jurisdiction 
is required, petitioners assert.
Petitioners argue that the history of Fannie Mae and its charter 
show that Congress did not mean to open the jurisdictional doors 
as wide as the respondents would prefer. Here we must detour 
into another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1349, which does extend federal 
jurisdiction to federally chartered corporations more than 50 percent 
government owned. That law was passed specifically to take cases 
out of federal court, they say.
At one time, § 1349 did apply to Fannie Mae. Congress began to 
privatize Fannie Mae in 1954, amending the charter to include 
the competent jurisdiction language. This Court had already said 
in Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900), and other 
cases that competent jurisdiction meant a court whose jurisdiction 
depends on other provisions of law. So it is reasonable to conclude 
that Congress meant the same thing.
Then, in 1974, Congress again amended the law to establish Fannie 
Mae’s residence as the District of Columbia for jurisdictional 
purposes. That change meant that Fannie Mae would have an entry 
into federal court by means of diversity jurisdiction; such a change 
would have been unnecessary if the charter gave it automatic 
federal jurisdiction, as the Ninth Circuit read the law, petitioners 
argue.
The Ninth Circuit relied on American National Red Cross v. S.G., 
which states that a charter may be read to confer federal court 
jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically mentions the federal 
courts. As the petitioners phrase it, the Ninth Circuit said that Red 
Cross created a “talismanic rule” that revolves around the word 
“federal,” saying that the word is necessary and sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction. In contrast, the correct reading of Red Cross is that the 
word “federal” is necessary but not sufficient to confer jurisdiction, 
petitioners argue.
Petitioners urge the Court to distinguish Red Cross because 
Fannie Mae’s charter is different and does not refer to competent 
jurisdiction. Red Cross concerned an amended sue-and-be-sued 
clause that granted authority to courts of law and equity, state and 
federal. The Red Cross Court read that amendment as granting 
federal jurisdiction because it would otherwise be forced to 
conclude that there was no reason for the change, petitioners say. 
The principles of statutory construction required the court to find 
federal jurisdiction. The same principles mandate that the term “of 
competent jurisdiction” in Fannie Mae’s charter be treated as more 
than mere surplusage.
And if the Court believes that Red Cross created what the petitioners 
call an “if federal, then jurisdiction” rule, it should overrule the 
case, petitioners say. That reading of Red Cross is at odds with the 
Court’s interpretation of other statutes and preexisting case law, 
they argue.
Finally, the petitioners urge the Court to avoid confronting a 
constitutional question about Congress’s reach under Article III of 
the Constitution. It is debatable whether Congress has the power 
to confer federal jurisdiction on all Fannie Mae suits. That question 
can be avoided by giving the charter its plain and natural meaning, 
and the Court has consistently attached importance to interpreting 
statutes to avoid deciding difficult constitutional problems when 
possible.
Respondents’ argument is essentially to say “no” to every point 
that petitioners make, although they also have a long line of cases 
they say support their positions. Petitioners distinguish those cases 
based on the language of the sue-and-be-sued clause and/or the 
subject of the litigation.
Respondents argue that since 1809, the Court has recognized 
that language authorizing suits in federal court suffices to confer 
federal jurisdiction. Respondents cite cases starting with Bank of 
the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809), and ending with Red 
Cross claiming they stand for the proposition that Congress has 
conferred federal jurisdiction over suits by and against federally 
chartered entities. (Of course, there are also cases that say that an 
independent source of jurisdiction is required.)
In Deveaux, the Court said that the words “in courts of record, 
or any place whatsoever” did not confer independent federal 
jurisdiction. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Bankers 
Trust Col. v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 241 U.S. 295 (1916). In 
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 
(1942), the Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction 
because the FDIC was authorized to sue and be sued “in any court 
of law or equity, State or Federal.” In Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824), jurisdiction was found via a bank charter 
that authorized suit “in any Circuit Court of the United States.”
Then came Red Cross—there, the Court held that the earlier line of 
cases put Congress on notice of how to confer federal jurisdiction, 
which it did by authorizing the Red Cross to sue and be sued in 
federal courts. The express authorization to sue in federal court 
means more than authorizing a general capacity to sue, the Red 
Cross Court said.
What respondents term the Deveaux-Osborn-Red Cross rule is 
“amply justified by its own long pedigree,” they assert. Such a 
rule, according to respondents, is also consistent with recognized 
principles of statutory construction for two reasons. The first is 
that the Court previously has given full meaning to every word in 
a sue-and-be-sued clause. Second, Congress legislates against a 
backdrop of prior cases and would recognize that, per the case law, 
an authorization to sue in federal courts would suffice to establish 
federal jurisdiction. 
Under the Deveaux-Osborn-Red Cross rule, Fannie Mae’s sue-
and-be-sued clause specifically authorizes suit in federal courts 
of competent jurisdiction, respondents continue. “Competent” 
jurisdiction does not necessarily refer to “independent” jurisdiction, 
respondents conclude.
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This reading gives meaning to every term in the provision and does 
not render the words “State or Federal” superfluous. (Recall that 
petitioners made the same argument—that laws should not be read 
in a way that renders language surplus, but refers to competent 
jurisdiction.) If Congress meant to confer general capacity, why 
refer to state or federal courts?
Continuing, the respondents say that the term “court of competent 
jurisdiction” is common in jurisdiction-conferring provisions, and 
prior to 1954 (when Fannie Mae’s charter was amended), courts 
routinely interpreted the phrase as conferring jurisdiction without 
another independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. Congress 
used the “competent jurisdiction” language after 1954 as well, 
respondents continued. 
The term is not superfluous because it can refer to personal 
jurisdiction, respondents pointed out. The appellate courts had 
construed the same language as jurisdiction-conferring in cases 
involving the FHA, and so it would have been possible for Congress 
to import the words into the Fannie Mae amendments.
Continuing, the respondents argue that in passing the 1954 
amendment, Congress did not intend to divest Fannie Mae of access 
to federal courts and put it in the position of a private entity. That 
law also deemed Fannie Mae a federal agency and asserted that 
it had governmental functions. So it was not Congress’s intent to 
take Fannie Mae out of § 1349’s provisions, conclude respondents, 
because Fannie Mae was not in the same position as private 
entities.
Furthermore, when Congress created Freddie Mac in 1970 as 
a private organization, Congress allowed it entry into federal 
courts. Since Freddie Mac was created to compete with Fannie 
Mae, respondents conclude, Congress must have wanted the two 
mortgage firms to have the same court access.
Finally, respondents wave off petitioners’ other arguments 
concerning § 1349, the 1974 amendment establishing that Fannie 
Mae was a District of Columbia corporation and the canon of 
constitutional avoidance as meritless.
SIGNIFICANCE
Fannie Mae is no stranger to litigation, and so the Court’s ruling in 
this case will have a wide impact just for that reason. But there are 
other reasons to watch this case.
First, the U.S. Solicitor General, at the invitation of the Court, has 
filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners. That likely was 
not an encouraging sign for respondents. The United States asserts 
simply that Fannie Mae’s charter does not confer original federal 
jurisdiction. The words “court of competent jurisdiction” mean that 
another basis for jurisdiction is required, according to the federal 
government. The government goes on to provide a close reading of 
the statute that aligns with that of the petitioners. 
The United States also notes that the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 
sue-and-be-sued provisions are virtually identical. That’s a lot of 
lawsuits. And although those departments are authorized by statute 
to sue in federal court, resolution in Lightfoot would determine 
whether private litigants could sue them in federal court based on 
state-law causes of action.
The American Association of Justice (AAJ), generally all plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, wants its members’ clients to be able to sue in state 
court without being overridden by federally chartered defendants. 
Removal to federal court makes the cases more difficult and 
expensive, the AAJ contends.
Such removal also consumes federal court resources that could be 
put to better use on cases that must be heard in federal court, and 
moves federal courts from being courts of limited jurisdiction to 
courts of general jurisdiction, the AAJ warns.
And federal judges are not experts in state law, the AAJ continues. 
Principles of federalism mean that state courts have an essential 
role that should not be overtaken by federal courts. “Even assuming 
that the federal court correctly applies state law, the outcome is one 
decided by judges not selected under the state’s system, who are not 
accountable to the state court’s constituency and who do not speak 
with the authority of the sovereign state on a matter of state law,” 
the AAJ points out. It urges the Court to follow the “clear statement 
doctrine” and require Congress to make its intention to alter the 
balance between state and federal governments unmistakably clear 
in a statute.
Barbara Jones is an attorney and editor of Minnesota Lawyer 
newspaper. She can be reached at barbarajones14@comcast.net or 
651.587.7803.
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C O P Y R I G H T
Form Over Function: Are the Designs of Uniforms Ineligible for 
Copyright Protection Because of Their Identifying Function?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
In order to receive copyright protection, aesthetic features that are incorporated into the design of a 
useful article, such as a garment, lamp, or piece of furniture, must be identifi ed separately from, and be 
capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article. Courts, the Copyright Offi ce, and 
academics have proposed various tests to distinguish between copyrightable materials and unprotectable 
industrial designs. The Sixth Circuit rejected all existing tests and created a new test. The Court must now 
determine what the appropriate test is to determine when a feature of a useful article is protectable under 
§ 101 of the Copyright Act. 
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.
Docket No. 15-866
Argument Date: Monday, October 31, 2016
From: The Sixth Circuit 
by Ben Depoorter
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, CA
ISSUES
What is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a useful 
article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act? 
Are copyright registrations entitled to extra-statutory Skidmore 
deference? 
FACTS
Varsity is a major manufacturer and distributor of cheerleading 
and dance-team uniforms and accessories. Varsity has registered 
hundreds of copyrights of two-dimensional drawings and 
photographs of uniforms. 
Star Athletica is a new entrant in the cheerleading-uniform market. 
Upon publication of Star’s fi rst catalogue, Varsity sued, alleging that 
Star’s cheerleader uniforms infringed Varsity’s copyright in its two-
dimensional cheerleader-uniform drawings and photos. 
The district court held that Varsity’s copyrights in two-dimensional 
drawings and photographs could not be used to prohibit Star from 
manufacturing and distributing cheerleading uniforms. The stripes, 
chevrons, zigzags, and color blocking imprinted on cheerleader 
uniforms were not copyrightable because these design elements 
could not be disaggregated from the cheerleader dress design, which 
were otherwise utilitarian. 
The district court framed the issue as whether “a cheerleading 
uniform can be conceived without any ornamentation or design, 
yet retain its utilitarian function as a cheerleading uniform.” The 
district court’s premise was that the function of a cheerleading 
uniform “is not merely to clothe the body; it is to clothe the body in 
a way that evokes the concept of cheerleading.” In other words, a 
cheerleading uniform without stripes, patterns, and chevrons, is not 
a cheerleading uniform.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit fi rst deferred to the registrations that 
had been issued to Varsity by the Copyright Offi ce, fi nding that 
a “comparison between the designs at issue in this case and the 
other Varsity registered designs confi rms that the Copyright Offi ce 
consistently found the arrangements of stripes, chevrons, and color 
blocking to be original and separable from the utilitarian aspects 
of the articles on which they appear, and therefore copyrightable.” 
Second, the panel majority acknowledged and rejected nine 
different tests to identify ornamental features that are separate 
from the utilitarian aspects of a useful article, rejecting all of 
these tests in favor of its own new, hybrid test. In applying its own 
test, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that Varsity’s graphic designs 
add decorative value that is unrelated to the functionality of the 
cheerleading uniforms as items of clothing. Rather, in the Sixth 
Circuit’s perspective, the graphic features of Varsity’s designs—the 
arrangement of stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color blocking—exist 
separate from the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading-uniform 
design, namely to cover the body, permit free movement, and wick 
moisture. 
The Sixth Circuit denied rehearing en banc but stayed its order 
pending the petition of certiorari. 
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CASE ANALYSIS
The Court is asked to address two legal issues.
First, the Court is asked to clarify the level of appropriate judicial 
deference with regard to copyright registrations. The Sixth Circuit 
in Varsity determined that a copyright registration is entitled 
to Skidmore deference (Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944)). Under Skidmore, the weight of an agency interpretation 
“depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.” 
The petitioner points out that the Sixth Circuit’s decision is 
unprecedented since no court has ever accorded Skidmore deference 
to the Copyright Office’s decision to register a copyright. A copyright 
is presumptively valid if it is filed not less than five years after 
the work is first published. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). In an infringement 
action, this presumption validity shifts to the defendant the burden 
of proving the registration’s invalidity. This can be accomplished 
by demonstrating that the Copyright Office erred in registering 
the copyright. According to the petitioner, Congress has thus 
determined the “deference” owed to the Copyright Office’s 
registration decision. In the petitioner’s viewpoint, where Congress 
has expressly defined a copyright registration’s effect in a legal 
proceeding regarding validity, courts should not accord greater 
weight to the registration via some form of judicial deference to 
the decision. Although courts generally accord some deference 
to agency determinations (United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218 (2001); Skidmore), deferring to the Copyright Office in a case 
challenging the validity of a registration places more weight in 
favor of a registration’s validity than Congress intended, according 
to the petitioner. The respondent points out that (1) the Sixth 
Circuit discussed Skidmore deference mainly to reject the higher 
level of deference that applies under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and (2) the 
issue of the appropriate judicial level of deference did not affect the 
outcome of the case.
Second, the Court is asked to provide guidance on the appropriate 
test to determine when a feature of a useful article is protectable 
under § 101 of the Copyright Act. The Court can formulate a new 
test or select one from the assortment of tests developed by circuit 
courts, the Copyright Office, and academic commentators. Although 
these tests sometimes overlap, significant differences exist as to 
their outcomes. For instance, while some tests are primarily focused 
on whether a product is the result of the type of creative decision-
making unrestrained by utilitarian motivations, other tests solely 
inquire whether the final product can be perceived as creative, 
separately from its utilitarian aspects. 
The petitioner emphasizes that the test developed by the Sixth 
Circuit conflicts with decisions of the Second and Fifth Circuits. 
According to the petitioner, the latter circuits apply tests that 
are more consistent with Congress’s long-standing policy not to 
extend copyright protection to garment designs. In these circuits, 
leading cases have denied copyright protection to casino uniforms 
and prom dress designs because the decorative elements are 
intrinsically linked to its utilitarian function. In Jovani Fashion, Ltd. 
v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit 
concluded that the function of a prom dress was to clothe the body 
“in an attractive way for a special occasion” because this “clothing, 
in addition to covering the body, serves a ‘decorative function.’” 
The Fifth Circuit in Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 
(5th Cir. 2005), explained that a casino uniform’s function is to 
identify its wearer as a member of a group. Along these lines, the 
function of cheerleading uniforms in the case at hand is to identify 
the wearer as a cheerleader, associating the wearer with a certain 
team, and enhancing the wearer’s attractiveness. As a result, the 
stripes, braids, and chevrons on a cheerleading uniform are integral 
to its identifying function, rendering Varsity’s design ineligible for 
copyright protection in the Second and Fifth Circuit. 
Respondent instead points to the distinction between fabric and 
dress designs. Fabric designs include patterns or artistic features 
that are imprinted onto a fabric. Dress or garment designs 
involve the shape, style, cut, and a dimension of a garment that 
are converted from fabric into a finished dress or other clothing 
garment. While fabric designs are eligible for copyright protection 
as two-dimensional graphic works (regardless of whether the design 
is used on clothing, rugs, or some other surface), courts treat the 
three-dimensional designs of garments themselves as unprotectable 
dress designs. Respondent accuses the petitioner of manufacturing 
a circuit split by comparing the Sixth Circuit’s decision involving 
fabric designs with decisions from the Fifth and Second Circuit that 
involve dress designs. 
Respondent maintains that the Sixth Circuit correctly applied the 
distinction between fabric and dress designs when it concluded 
that Varsity’s graphic designs were “like” fabric designs. According 
to the respondent, Star’s contention that the designs cannot be 
copyrighted because the “braid[s], chevrons, and color blocks” are 
what make cheerleading uniforms actual cheerleading uniforms is a 
flawed, fact-bound assertion that does not warrant review. 
SIGNIFICANCE
Courts across the country have struggled to agree on one single 
test to draw the line between copyright-eligible subject matter and 
unprotected industrial design. The case provides an opportunity for 
the Court to provide guidance on the appropriate test for courts to 
determine whether creative features that are incorporated into the 
design of a useful article can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, its utilitarian aspects. Given 
the different outcomes under the various existing tests, uniformity 
offers the benefit of improving predictability in this challenging area 
of copyright law. 
The outcome of the case is of particular relevance to the fashion 
industry. First, the outcome might help further clarify the line 
between copyright-eligible fabric designs and unprotectable dress 
designs. Second, the Court must determine if and how identifying 
features of decorative designs affect the scope of copyright 
protection for fashion items. If the Court follows the Sixth Circuit’s 
narrow interpretation of functionality with regard to garments, 
the outcome likely broadens design rights, enabling designers to 
increasingly enforce copyright in two-dimensional sketches and 
photographs against garments that feature substantially similar 
decorative features. If the Court instead follows the logic of 
applications to prom dresses and casino uniforms from the Second 
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and Fifth Circuit, copyright protection remains elusive to fashion 
designs that include identifying decorative features. In the case 
at hand, for instance, this approach would render decorations 
commonly associated with cheerleading, such as stripes and 
chevrons, ineligible for copyright protection. 
Professor Ben Depoorter is Sunderland Chair at the University 
of California, Hastings College of the Law and is an Affiliate 
Scholar at the Stanford University Center for Internet & Society. 
A graduate of Yale Law School, Ben Depoorter writes on copyright 
law enforcement, technology and intellectual property, with an 
emphasis on behavioral research. He can be reached at depoorter@
uchastings.edu or 203.415.2039.
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Justice Kennedy: Well, it doesn’t follow from your position.
Mr. Yarger: And it does. And our position is it should apply there. 
If the jury system is so important to be protected in these other 
contexts, and is—and this rule is necessary to allow them to fully 
and fairly deliberate the issues, it ought to apply in that context as 
well. But, again, I don’t think that question needs to be confronted 
or answered in this case. 
 *  *  *  *
Chief Justice Roberts: But what other types of questions would—
what types of questions would you propound if you were trying to 
elicit whether there was bias on the part of a prospective juror?
Mr. Yager: I would propound the same types of questions that 
Petitioner’s counsel used below as to other issues: People’s 
experiences on the subject, whether they believe racial issues still 
persist in this country, and what their attitudes are.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: But … isn’t it so that many lawyers 
won’t ask that question even if they could? Because just by 
asking the question, you’re putting race in the minds of the jurors, 
and you’d rather not do that.
Mr. Yager: That’s certainly the argument the Petitioner makes 
here. But what experience has shown is that a careful and mature 
voir dire on race is not likely to infuse racism into jurors. In fact, 
quite the opposite has been observed to happen. When jurors are 
respectfully confronted with racial issues at the outset of a trial, 
they tend to counter any racial bias, whether explicit or implicit, 
that might come up during the thought process. 
continued from page 59
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C I V I L  R I G H T S
Can the City of Miami Bring a Fair Housing Case Against Private Banks for Lending 
Practices That Led to Increased Foreclosures, Lower Home Values, and Lower 
Property Tax Revenue and Increased Maintenance Costs for the City?
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
The City of Miami brought lawsuits against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Citigroup, alleging that the 
banks engaged in discriminatory lending practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The City claimed 
that these practices led to increased foreclosures, which led to decreased home values, resulting in lower 
property tax revenue for the City. The City also claimed that increased foreclosures required it to provide 
increased police, fi re, and maintenance services.
Bank of America v. Miami and Wells Fargo v. Miami 
Docket Nos. 15-1111 and 15-1112
Argument Date: November 8, 2016
From: The Eleventh Circuit 
by Steven D. Schwinn
The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL
INTRODUCTION
The Fair Housing Act permits only an “aggrieved person” to sue 
to enforce its antidiscrimination provisions. The Act also requires 
a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s discrimination was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. If a plaintiff is not an 
“aggrieved person” under the Act, or if a plaintiff cannot show that 
the defendant’s discrimination was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injuries, the courts will dismiss the case.
ISSUES
Is the City of Miami an “aggrieved person,” within the zone of 
interests protected by the Fair Housing Act?
Did the City of Miami suffi ciently show that the banks’ 
discriminatory practices were the proximate cause of its decreased 
property tax revenue and increased services to foreclosed 
properties?
FACTS
On December 13, 2011, the City of Miami brought three separate 
fair housing lawsuits in federal court against Wells Fargo, Bank 
of America, and Citigroup. Each of these suits alleged that the 
defendant banks engaged in a decades-long pattern of racially 
discriminatory lending practices. In particular, Miami claimed 
that the defendants refused to extend mortgage credit to black and 
Latino borrowers as compared to white borrowers, and that, when 
they did extend credit to black and Latino borrowers, they provided 
 loans with more burdensome terms—higher risks, steeper fees, and 
higher costs—than the terms for equally qualifi ed white borrowers. 
Miami also claimed that the banks created internal incentive 
structures that encouraged bank employees to provide these more 
burdensome loans.
Miami alleged that these practices violated the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) by intentionally discriminating against minority borrowers 
and by creating a racially disparate impact on minority borrowers 
(because of a disproportionate rate of foreclosures on minority-
owned properties and a disproportionate number of exploitative 
loans in minority neighborhoods). The City claimed monetary 
damages based on lost property-tax revenue, which was caused 
by decreased home values, which was caused by unnecessary 
and premature foreclosures (which were caused by the illegal 
lending practices). The City also sought damages for increased 
city services—police, fi re, building inspection, and the like—that 
attended foreclosed properties. 
The district courts dismissed the cases, holding that Miami lacked 
standing to bring a case under the FHA and that the City had failed 
to allege that the banks’ lending practices were the “proximate 
cause” of its alleged harms. In three separate opinions, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 
Wells Fargo and Bank of America appealed to the Supreme Court 
(Citigroup did not), and the Court consolidated the cases. 
CASE ANALYSIS
This case involves two distinct issues: whether the City can 
sue under the FHA, and whether the banks’ practices were the 
proximate cause of the City’s alleged harms. The City has to prevail 
on both in order to win the case. Let’s take them one at a time.
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Can the City sue under the FHA?
As a general matter, a person can bring a statutory cause of action 
only if that person falls within the “zone of interests” protected 
by the statute. The FHA itself defines the zone of interest: It 
authorizes only an “aggrieved person” to sue, and defines an 
“aggrieved person” as anyone who “claims to have been injured by 
a discriminatory housing practice,” or “believes that such person 
will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to 
occur.” This clearly covers an individual who was subject to housing 
discrimination. But the question here is whether it also covers the 
City of Miami.
The Eleventh Circuit held that “aggrieved person” covers Miami. 
The court based its conclusion on three Supreme Court cases from 
the 1970s and 1980s that held that “aggrieved person” under the 
FHA extends as far as the standing principles under Article III of the 
Constitution permit. This case tests the continued viability of those 
cases.
The banks argue that the City falls outside the zone of interests 
protected by the Act. They say that the Supreme Court ruled in a 
unanimous opinion just five years ago that the term “aggrieved” 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes a suit by 
a “plaintiff with an interest arguably sought to be protected by 
the statute, while excluding plaintiffs * * * whose interests are 
unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII.” Thompson v. N. 
Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011). The banks say that, given the 
similarities between Title VII and the FHA, the same interpretation 
should govern the FHA. The banks contend that Thompson, which 
defines Title VII’s zone of interests more narrowly than Article III 
standing, effectively abrogated the Court’s statements in earlier 
cases suggesting that “aggrieved person” extends as far as Article 
III standing.
The banks argue that under the appropriate test, the City does 
not fall within the FHA’s zone of interests. They say that the FHA 
protects against discriminatory practices. But they claim that the 
City’s complaint pleaded only financial injuries that depend only 
on increased foreclosures—not discriminatory practices. “Indeed, 
they are indifferent to whether those foreclosures were the result 
of discrimination at all.” The banks contend that because the City’s 
complaint falls outside the discrimination zone of interest that the 
FHA protects, the City’s complaint should be dismissed.
The City counters that it does fall within the FHA’s zone of interests. 
The City says that it has a “strong and inherent interest in the 
benefits of an integrated community,” that it was “harmed in its fair 
housing efforts,” and that it suffered “further injuries in the form 
of lowered property tax revenues and remediation costs.” Miami 
claims that these interests and harms fall squarely within the zone 
of interests protected by the FHA, and that the Supreme Court 
itself said so in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 
91 (1979), one of those cases from the 1970s. Moreover, the City 
contends that its position is supported by the history and purposes 
of the FHA. It says that the FHA was enacted, and later amended, 
to eradicate housing discrimination with a “special emphasis on 
the problems discrimination caused for cities.” Miami claims that 
Congress amended the FHA with full knowledge of the Court’s 
rulings from the 1970s and 1980s. It says that Congress therefore 
“endorsed” the Court’s holding that the FHA zone of interests 
extends as far as Article III standing. Finally, Miami contends that 
the Court’s ruling in Thompson does not abrogate its holding in 
Gladstone, because Thompson dealt with Title VII, and the FHA is 
different.
Are the banks’ practices the “proximate cause” of  
Miami’s injuries?
In addition to falling within the zone of interests in order to bring a 
case under the FHA, a plaintiff also has to plead that the defendant’s 
discriminatory practices were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries. Proximate cause requires a sufficiently close connection 
between the discriminatory behavior and the plaintiff’s alleged 
harms that resulted from that behavior. Here, the parties dispute 
whether the banks’ practices were the proximate cause of Miami’s 
reduced tax revenue and its increased services to foreclosed 
properties.
The banks argue that Miami’s alleged harms are too remote from 
the banks’ practices. They say that the harms are “several steps 
removed from any such discrimination,” if, indeed, they derive from 
the discrimination at all. “In that sense, the City is no different 
from the innumerable other individuals and entities that suffered 
economic losses after the collapse of the American housing market.” 
In other words, the banks say that the foreclosures (which are the 
immediate cause of the City’s harm) were caused by many factors—
at best, several steps removed from any discrimination, but quite 
possibly caused by factors having nothing to do with the banks’ 
discrimination. Because the City cannot trace its alleged harms 
more directly to the banks’ practices, the banks claim that the City 
has failed sufficiently to plead proximate cause.
The City, for its part, argues that it has sufficiently pleaded that the 
banks’ practices were the proximate cause of its harms. The City 
claims that it only has to demonstrate “proximate cause substantial 
enough and close enough to the harm to effectuate the law’s 
purposes.” Miami says it easily meets this test. The City contends 
that its regression analysis separated out the effects of other causes 
on foreclosures “so that its claims were limited to the discriminatory 
loans and the harms they caused.” Moreover, the City claims that 
the banks’ analytical tools showed which of their loans were likely 
to go into foreclosure even before they were issued. Miami says 
that “countless studies demonstrate foreclosures’ impact on cities,” 
thus establishing a chain of causation between the banks’ practices 
and the City’s harms that comfortably meets the proximate cause 
requirement.
(The government, as amicus, supports Miami on both issues and 
makes substantially similar arguments.)
SIGNIFICANCE
Miami’s lawsuit is innovative—or “ambitious,” in the words of 
the Eleventh Circuit—exactly because it tests the outer edges of 
the FHA, as to both the “aggrieved person” requirement and the 
proximate cause requirement. (For reference, the typical case 
under the FHA involves an individual or group that has been directly 
harmed by a discrete and discriminatory housing-related practice 
by a bank, property owner, landlord, or someone else involved in the 
housing market.) The Court’s ruling will tell us just how flexible 
these requirements are, and, by extension, whether and how other 
cities might bring their own FHA lawsuits against banks and other 
players in the housing market.
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But nothing about this case will affect the more ordinary FHA 
lawsuit, brought by individuals or groups. Those lawsuits will 
continue as long as there are FHA violations. Those lawsuits seek 
damages for the immediate victims of housing discrimination, 
based upon the victims’ injuries that resulted from that 
discrimination. This is an important form of relief for victims 
of housing discrimination, and an important deterrent against 
discriminatory housing practices by those in the housing market. 
But this case is different in kind. That’s because Miami seeks 
damages for entirely different types of harms—harms unique to 
Miami as a city, which collects tax revenues and provides certain 
services. Thus, Miami’s theory comes at the FHA from a different 
angle, with a different type of claim for relief, which may be 
much larger than an aggregation of relief by individual victims of 
discrimination. In that way, this lawsuit, if successful, would set a 
precedent for a kind of relief that is complementary to the relief in a 
more ordinary FHA case and an additional deterrent against housing 
discrimination. In other words, this lawsuit, if successful, will invite 
other cities and municipalities to lodge their own FHA complaints 
that will complement the individual complaints of their citizens. (By 
the time the banks filed their petitions for certiorari, at least twelve 
other cities and local governments filed similar suits, most of them, 
like Miami’s, against multiple banks.) 
This is the second time in as many Terms that the Supreme Court 
will rule on a significant fair housing case. The Court just last Term 
handed an important victory to fair housing advocates by ruling 
that the FHA bans disparate impact discrimination (in addition 
to disparate treatment discrimination). While the Court’s ruling 
in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), may 
not necessarily telegraph a likely result in this case (because the 
issues are very different), it may predict the Court’s approach. In 
particular, the Court in Texas Department looked to Title VII and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act to help determine whether 
the FHA protected against disparate-impact discrimination. If the 
Court similarly looks to Title VII in this case, it may also look to 
the holding in Thompson and (as the banks argue) rule that the 
zone of interests in the FHA is narrower than Article III standing 
and does not include the City. But at the same time, Miami and the 
government give good reasons why the Court should not look to 
Title VII. In particular, they argue that the FHA specifically defines 
“aggrieved person,” while Title VII does not, and that the Court has 
construed “aggrieved person” under the FHA in the opinions in the 
1970s and 1980s and that Congress ratified those opinions.
Finally, remember that a 4-4 tie on the Court—a possibility here—
would leave the lower court’s ruling in place, without establishing 
any Supreme Court precedent. That would be a victory for Miami.
Steven D. Schwinn is a professor of law at The John Marshall 
Law School and coeditor of the Constitutional Law Prof Blog. He 
specializes in constitutional law and human rights. He can be 
reached at sschwinn@jmls.edu or 312.386.2865.
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